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The Netherlands: The Protection of Fundamental Human Rights In Criminal Process1   
 
 
Piet Hein van Kempen2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands currently consists of three countries: The Netherlands3 
(Europe), The Netherlands Antilles (five Caribbean islands)4 and Aruba (a Caribbean 
island). The basis of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is the Charter for the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (het Statuut) of 28 October 1954.5 In 1954 Aruba was part of The Netherlands 
Antilles, but it became independent of the other islands on 1 January 1986. In principle, 
The Netherlands, The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are fully autonomous in their internal 
affairs. The emphasis of this contribution is The Netherlands. 
The Netherlands is governed by the rule of law. International human rights treaties play an 
important role in that regard. As regards criminal procedure, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is of especially great significance. The 
right to liberty (Article 5 ECHR), the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR), and the right to 
privacy (Article 8 ECHR) are most frequently invoked by the defence in criminal 
proceedings, and exert a daily influence on criminal justice process. Nevertheless, 
increasingly international human rights provisions seem to be fulfilled in Dutch criminal 
procedure more minimally than they used to be. It would seem, therefore, that one can 
detect a development from an extensive realization of fundamental rights to an often merely 
sufficient fulfilment. This relates to suspects; the protection of victims’ fundamental rights 
has expanded greatly. 
In order to secure a reasonable perception of the way both international and regional 
fundamental rights instruments are implemented in the Dutch criminal procedure system, a 
description will be given first of which instruments are relevant to The Netherlands and 
                                                 
1 With gratitude to assistant student Ms. Andra Schrama for her valuable contribution in collecting materials needed to write this contribution 
2 Professor of Human Rights Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, and part time Justice in the criminal chamber of the Court of Appeal, ’s-
Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands. 
3 Although formally and principally incorrect, The Netherlands is often referred to as Holland. North and South Holland in the western part of 
the Netherlands are only two of the twelve provinces within The Netherlands. 
4 The governments of The Netherlands and of the Islands have plans to restructure the Kingdom of The Netherlands. These plans entail that 
two of the five islands of The Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao and Sint-Maarten, would become countries of their own within The Kingdom, while 
the other three islands would become a direct part of The Netherlands as special municipalities. 
5 Entry into force: 29 December 1954 (Stb. 1954, 596). Most recently amended 7 September 1998 (Stb. 1998, 579). (Stb. = Staatsblad, the 
official Bulletin of Acts). 
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their legal position in the Dutch legal order, after which the organisation of criminal justice 
and the system of criminal procedure law is explained. Subsequently the position of human 
rights in Dutch criminal procedure is elaborated. Finally, I discuss the most important 
changes within criminal procedure that might effect the realization of human rights. 
 
2. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO DUTCH CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
 
A. The Status of International Law in the Dutch Legal Order 
With regard to international law, a monistic system applies: all international law – both 
written and unwritten – that is in force for the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a part of the 
domestic legal order. No transformation via a national order of the international norm into 
national law is needed. Moreover, Article 93 of the Constitution specifies that “Provisions 
of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding on all 
persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published.” In 
addition, Article 94 establishes that “Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom 
shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are 
binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.” So international and 
regional human rights and humanitarian law treaties have power over national law (even 
over statutes and the Constitution), and the provisions in those treaties can be invoked by 
individuals and must be applied in court if and only if they are “binding on all persons”.  
This is of specific importance in relation to human rights: while the courts are still not 
authorized to review Acts of Parliament against fundamental rights laid down in the 
Constitution (toetsingsverbod; Article 120 of the Constitution),6 they are actually obliged to 
do so against fundamental rights in treaties insofar as provisions are concerned that are 
binding on all persons. Thus in that case the courts have a duty to apply these international 
human rights provisions ex officio. Whether treaty provisions meet this requirement is 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Provisions are usually considered to have such general 
binding power if they can be applied directly, that is without the need to regulate in further 
                                                 
6 A Bill is presently under discussion in parliament that would lift the review prohibition for specific constitutional fundamental rights; see infra 
sub 5.A). 
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detail.7 Most human rights embodied in legally binding treaties that are relevant to criminal 
procedure – usually civil rights – are regarded as having this kind of binding power. 
Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution do not, however, apply to provisions in such soft law 
instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is party to most of the important international and 
European human rights treaties and endorses many soft law codifications of human rights, 
such as declarations, sets of rules and principles, and codes of conduct. Here I shall in 
principle only mention those (international and regional) instruments that are expressly 
relevant to criminal procedure – i.e., the pre-trial stage of criminal investigation, 
prosecution, and the trial proceedings in court – within the Kingdom; the same applies to 
possible reservations to the instruments.8 
 
B. International Human Rights Instruments 
Being one of the 51 founding members of the United Nations, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands joined the organisation on 10 December 1945. This was precisely three years 
before the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR, 1948). The Dutch Government recognizes that this declaration – to which 
one cannot of course become a party – applies at all times, anywhere in the world.9 The 
Kingdom is furthermore a party to eight of the so-called nine core international human 
rights treaties, most of which are mentioned below.10  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the covenant’s 
Optional Protocol on an individual complaints procedure (ICCPR OP-I, 1966) were signed 
on 25 June 1969,11 while on 9 August 1990 The Kingdom of the Netherlands became a 
party to the Second Optional Protocol on the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR OP-II, 
1989).12 Several reservations are made in respect of the ICCPR. The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands does not consider itself bound by the obligations on the treatment of prisoners 
                                                 
7 See Karel Kraan, The Kingdom of the Netherlands, in: Lucas Prakke & Constantijn Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member 
States, Deventer: Kluwer, 2004, p. 627. 
8 All the instruments mentioned in this contribution are contained in P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen (ed.), International and Regional Human Rights 
Documents, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers 2008. See the Treaty Database on <http://www.minbuza.nl/verdragen/en/home> (in English) for 
a complete overview of human rights instruments to which the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party, of dates of signature, ratification and 
entry into force, and reservations, declarations and objections; see also <http://sim.law.uu.nl.> 
9 See the governments’ recent Human Rights Strategy for Foreign Policy: “Mensenrechtenstrategie voor het buitenlands beleid”, in: 
Kamerstukken II, 2007-2008, 31 263, nr. 1, and nr. 17, p. 4. (Kamerstukken = parliamentary documents; II = Second Chamber). 
10 See the list on <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm>. 
11 Entry into force: 11 March 1979 for The Netherlands and The Netherlands Antilles, and 1 January 1986 for Aruba. 
12 Entry into force: 11 July 1991 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
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set out in Article 10 § 2 and § 3 (second sentence). Furthermore, on the fair trial provisions 
in Article 14 it reserves (as regards § 3 (d)) the statutory option of removing a person 
charged with a criminal offence from the courtroom in the interests of proper conduct of the 
proceedings, and (on § 5), the statutory power of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands 
(Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) to have sole jurisdiction to try certain categories of persons 
charged with serious offences committed in the discharge of a public office. And as to § 7 it 
accepts this provision only insofar as no obligations arise from it further to those set out in 
article 68 of the Criminal Code of The Netherlands (Wetboek van Strafrecht – Sr) and 
article 70 of the Criminal Code of The Netherlands Antilles, which provisions are 
codifications of the principle non bis in idem (protection against double jeopardy) (cf. infra 
sub 4.F).  
The countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are also parties to several specific human 
rights and humanitarian law treaties. On 8 December 1949, the Kingdom signed all four 
Geneva Conventions (1949) on humanitarian law.13 Protocol I (1977) and Protocol II 
(1977)14 as well as the recent Protocol III (2005)15 followed later. No reservations were 
entered as to any of these conventions and protocols thereto. The International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1965) was signed on 24 
October 1966, devoid of reservations.16 The competence of the Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination to receive individual complaints (see Article 14 
CERD) is recognized for the whole of the Kingdom.17 As of 17 July 1980, The Kingdom 
became a party (without reservations) to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979),18 and it recognizes the competence of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to receive individual 
                                                 
13 These are entitled: Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Geneva 
Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; Geneva Convention 
relative to the treatment of prisoners of war; Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Entry into force of 
all four conventions: 3 February 1955 for The Netherlands and The Netherlands Antilles, and 1 January 1986 for Aruba. 
14 These are respectively Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Both protocols were signed on 12 December 1977 by The Kingdom, and both 
entered into force on 26 December 1987 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
15 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol 
III). Signed: 14 March 2006 by the Kingdom of the Netherlands; entry into force: 13 June 2007 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
16 Entry into force: 9 January 1972 for The Netherlands and The Netherlands Antilles, and 1 January 1986 for Aruba. The 1992 Amendment to 
article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has been accepted for The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands on 24 January 1995. Especially relevant to criminal procedure are Articles 5 (a) and (b) and 6 CERD. 
17 See the declarations by the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the treaty. 
18 Entry into force: 8 August 1991 for the whole of The Kingdom. The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepted – on 10 December 1997 – the 
1995 Amendment to article 20, paragraph (1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Particularly 
relevant to criminal procedure is Articles 15 CEDAW. 
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complaints under the Optional Protocol (CEDAW OP, 2000)19. Almost five years later, on 
4 February 1985, the Kingdom signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1984).20 The competence of the 
Committee against Torture with regard to Inter-State Complaints (Article 21) and 
Individual Complaints (Article 22) is accepted.21 The CAT Optional Protocol (CAT OP, 
2002) on the establishment of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Subcommittee on Prevention) was 
signed but has not been ratified at the time of writing.22 Again some five years later – on 26 
January 1990 – The Kingdom became a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC, 1989).23 It is also a party to the two protocols to the convention, but these 
have not yet entered into force in the whole of The Kingdom.24 With regard to the 
convention some reservations were made that are relevant to criminal procedure. On article 
37 (c) CRC it is stated that the provisions therein “shall not prevent the application of adult 
penal law to children of sixteen years and older, provided that certain criteria laid down by 
law have been met.” And concerning Article 40 The Kingdom of the Netherlands made 
clear that “cases involving minor offences may be tried without the presence of legal 
assistance and that with respect to such offences the position remains that no provision is 
made in all cases for a review of the facts or of any measures imposed as a consequence.” 
On 30 March 2007 the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006), but has not yet ratified it.25 It made reservations, 
but none of these are directly relevant to criminal procedure. Furthermore, so far the 
Kingdom has not subscribed to the Optional Protocol on individual complaints mechanisms 
(CRPD OP, 2006). The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (CED, 2006) was signed 30 March 2007, too, but has not yet been 
ratified. Finally, none of the countries within The Kingdom of the Netherlands nor The 
                                                 
19 Signed: 10 December 1999; entry into force: 22 August 2002 for the whole of The Kingdom.  
20 Entry into force: 20 January 1989 for The Netherlands, The Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The 1992 Amendments to Article 17, paragraph 
7, and article 18, paragraph 5, of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment were 
accepted for the whole of The Kingdom on 24 January 1995. 
21 See the declarations by the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the treaty.  
22 Signed: 3 June 2005. Since the CAT OP has not yet been ratified, it has not entered into force for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
23 Entry into force: 8 March 1995 for The Netherlands, 16 January 1998 for The Netherlands Antilles, and 17 January for Aruba. The 1995 
Amendment to Article 43 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been accepted for the whole of The Kingdom on 4 December 
1996 (entry into force: 18 November 2002). Specifically relevant to criminal procedure in the CRC are Articles 3, 16, 37, and 40.  
24 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC OP AC, 2000), was 
signed on 7 September 2000, but has not been ratified and has therefore not entered into force. The other protocol, i.e. Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC OP SC, 2000), was signed on 
7 September 2000 too, and entered into force on 23 September 2005 for The Netherlands, and on 17 October 2006 for Aruba; it has not yet 
entered into force for The Netherlands Antilles. 
25 Particularly relevant to criminal procedure are Articles 13, 14, 15, 22, and 23 CRPD. 
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Kingdom as such is party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW, 1990).26 
 
C. Regional European Human Rights Instruments 
At the European regional level, The Netherlands (not per se The Kingdom as a whole) 
belongs to several organisations that concern themselves with human rights. First of all, 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a founding member of the Council of Europe (CoE), an 
organisation that aims to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law. By 
signing the CoE Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms – the so-called European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950) – on 4 
November 1950, The Kingdom became one of the original signatories to this treaty.27 What 
is more, all fourteen protocols to the convention have been signed, and these have all been 
ratified, with the exception of the Seventh Protocol (ECHR P7, 1984). This protocol is 
particularly relevant to criminal procedure since it provides for, inter alia, rights to appeal 
in criminal cases, compensation for miscarriage of justice, and protection against double 
jeopardy (ne bis in idem).  
With regard to appeal in criminal cases (Article 2 ECHR P7), the Dutch Government 
declared that “it interprets paragraph 1 of Article 2 thus that the right conferred on everyone 
convicted of a criminal offence to have conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher 
tribunal relates only to convictions or sentences given in the first instance by tribunals 
which, according to Netherlands law, are in charge of jurisdiction in criminal matters.” It is 
unclear whether The Netherlands is ever going to ratify the Seventh Protocol. The ECHR 
provides for an individual complaints mechanism, the acceptance of which is obligatory for 
all state parties (see Article 34 ECHR) since the entry into force of the Eleventh Protocol on 
1 November 1998.28 Another important treaty within the Council of Europe is the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (ECPT, 1987), of which the Kingdom became an original signatory on 26 
November 1987.29 Protocol I (1993) and Protocol II (1993), both of which amend the 
                                                 
26 See as relevant to criminal procedure especially Articles 16-19 CMW. 
27 Entry into force: 31 August 1954 for The Netherlands, 31 December 1955 for The Netherlands Antilles, and 1 January 1986 for Aruba. 
28 The right of individual petition before the European Court of Human Rights as provided for in the Ninth Protocol (which is terminated by the 
Eleventh Protocol) had already been recognized since 1 October 1994 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
29 Entry into force: 1 February 1989 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
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ECPT, were also signed later.30 A soft law instrument that merits mention here is the 
Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and 
the Fight against Terrorism (2002). 
Furthermore, The Netherlands (not The Kingdom as a whole) is one of the original member 
states of what is presently known as the European Union (EU).31 Within the EU many 
instruments relevant to human rights have been adopted. One of the most important is the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). Currently it is not directly 
legally binding on the member states and organs within the Union, but it is supposed to 
gain this status in the near future. This depends on whether the Treaty of Lisbon will enter 
into force or not.32 The Netherlands has approved this amending treaty.33 The provisions of 
the Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law. Once the Charter has legally binding 
status, individuals can invoke the charter rights in national criminal procedure, but only 
with regard to a substantive or a procedural subject within the field of the law of the Union. 
 Finally, I should mention the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
(OSCE), of which The Netherlands is also one of the founding members. Within the 
framework of this organization several declarations and other documents have been 
adopted that are relevant to criminal procedure. Specifically noteworthy is the 2006 
Declaration on Criminal Justice Systems.34 These documents are of marginal importance 
only to the practice of Dutch criminal procedure. They are not legally binding and they 
cannot be invoked by individuals in a court of law. 
 
3. DUTCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
A. General 
                                                 
30 Both protocols were signed on 5 May 1994, and both entered into force on 1 March 2002 for the whole of The Kingdom. 
31 The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are not full members of the EU, but each is a so-called Overseas Country or Territory associated with 
the Union. 
32 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the European Union Treaty and the European Community Treaty (signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007) 
stipulates that “The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”; see Article 6 
of the consolidated version of the EU Treaty.  
33 See the Approval by Parliament’s First Chamber (Eerste Kamer) in Handelingen I 2007-2008, nr. 38, 8 July 2008, p. 1618. 
34 Document MC.DOC/4/06 of 5 December 2006, adopted at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Brussels. Other documents that 
contain provisions relevant to criminal procedure are, e.g.: Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE (1990) (see § 5); Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991) (see § I.23). 
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Fundamental rights that are relevant to criminal procedure in The Netherlands are only be 
found in international and regional instruments; there are also some in the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.35 The Constitution provides for fundamental rights in 
Chapter 1, i.e., Articles 1 to 23. Directly or at least indirectly relevant to criminal procedure 
are: Article 1 on equal treatment; Article 6 on the freedom of religion and belief; Article 7 
on the freedom of expression; the rights to association and to assembly and demonstration 
in Articles 8 and 9; the right to privacy in Article 10; Article 11 on the right to inviolability 
of the person; the right to respect for the home and correspondence in Articles 12 and 13; 
the right to liberty and habeas corpus in Article 15; the legality principle or nulla poena 
sine praevia lege poenali in Article 16; the prohibition against being kept from the 
competent court or the principle ius de non evocando in Article 17; and the right to legal 
representation in Article 18.36 Furthermore, Article 113 demands that the “trial of offences 
shall [also] be the responsibility of the judiciary.” Article 114 of the Constitution holds that 
capital punishment may not be imposed. And Article 121 states that trials shall be held in 
public, and that judgments shall specify the grounds on which they are based, and be 
pronounced in public. The Constitution does not provide for a provision on the right to a 
fair trial as such.37 Moreover, as has already been mentioned above, the Dutch courts are 
(still) not authorized to review Acts of Parliament against fundamental rights laid down in 
the Constitution (toetsingsverbod; Article 120 of the Constitution).38 This implies an 
important limitation on the possibility for the defence to successfully invoke constitutional 
rights in criminal trials.  
Article 107 of the Constitution stipulates that “criminal procedure shall be regulated by Act 
of Parliament in general legal codes without prejudice to the power to regulate certain 
matters in separate Acts of Parliament.” So the legal basis of criminal procedure in The 
Netherlands is the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering - Sv) of 
1926.39 This is a statute. Provisions of or relevant to criminal procedure are provided for in 
several other statutes too, such as the 1928 Narcotic Drug Offences Act (Opiumwet), the 
                                                 
35 Generally on the fundamental rights in the Constitution, see Constantijn A.J.M. Kortmann & Paul Bovend’Eert, Dutch Constitutional Law, 
The Hague / London / Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 145-159. 
36 Cf. Jaap de Hullu, Criminal Law Aspects of Human Rights Protection in The Netherlands, vol. 3 Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and 
Central Europe, nr. 2 (special: Human Rights as Constitutional Rights),  1996, p. 173-179.  
37 A critic is P.A.M. Mevis, Constitutioneel strafrecht (Constitutional Criminal Law), Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1998, p. 10-11, 41-44. See also R. 
de Lange & P.A.M. Mevis, ‘Constitutional Guarantees for the Independence of the Judiciary’, vol. 11.1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
(May 2007), <http://www.ejcl.org/111/art111-15.pdf>. 
38 See supra section I.1. 
39 On this Code, see Peter J. P. Tak, The Dutch criminal justice system, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008, p. 29-37. 
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1950 Economic Offences Act (Wet op de economische delicten), and the 1997 Act on 
Weapons and Munitions (Wet wapens en munitie).40 Lower legislative bodies (such as 
provinces and municipalities) have no autonomous power to regulate criminal procedure, 
and neither do the courts. Nevertheless, the court’s case-law – especially that of the 
criminal chamber of the Supreme Court – is of great importance to the meaning, scope, and 
purpose of provisions of criminal procedure.  
The public prosecution service (Openbaar Ministerie) has exclusive power to prosecute 
individuals and legal persons. The Minister of Justice is politically accountable for the 
prosecution service, its actions and decisions. The prosecution service is responsible for 
criminal investigation by the police (politie) and the use of investigative powers. Methods 
of investigation that substantially infringe fundamental rights can only be employed if they 
have a basis in law. This requirement results from the principle of legality (Article 1 Sv), 
and from the fundamental rights provisions in, e.g., the Constitution, the ECHR, and the 
ICCPR. Investigative methods can always be employed that do not breach fundamental 
rights, or not substantially; Article 2 of the Police Act (Politiewet) on the task of the police 
is considered by the courts to provide the relevant basis.  
Additionally, all powers that infringe fundamental rights can generally be used only in case 
of reasonable suspicion that an offence (infraction or crime) has been committed (cf. 
Article 27 Sv). A reasonable suspicion does not require much, however: under certain 
circumstances it may even be constituted by an anonymous tip. In ordinary cases the 
condition of reasonable suspicion applies, e.g., to arrest, pre-trial detention, search and 
seizure, interrogation of the suspect, and to all kinds of special investigative powers (see 
Articles 126g-126ni Sv), such as recording communication, surveillance, infiltration, 
running informants, and undercover pseudo-purchases (see also infra sub 4.C).41 If 
terrorism is concerned, though, these special covert investigation powers, as well as powers 
to search objects, vehicles and clothing, may be used if there is merely “an indication of a 
terrorist crime” (Articles 126za-126zs Sv), which requirement can be met even more easily 
than the requirement of “reasonable suspicion”.42 Furthermore, in connection with 
                                                 
40 See on sources of criminal law in general J.F. Nijboer, ‘The Criminal Justice System’, in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver & E.H. Hondius, 
Introduction to Dutch Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006, p. 402-406. 
41 See Council of Europe, ‘Reply to the Questionnaire on Special Investigation Techniques in Relation to Acts of Terrorism – Netherlands’ on: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/fight_against_terrorism/4_theme_files/special_investigation_techniques/Netherlands%2
0reply.pdf>. 
42 For the definition of “terrorist crime”, see Article 83 Sr. 
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organised crime, covert investigation powers may be used in case of “reasonable suspicion” 
that a serious crime (as defined in Article 67 § 1 Sv) “has been committed or that such 
crimes are being planned or committed by a criminal organisation, which in view of their 
nature or connection with other crimes planned or committed by the same organisation 
constitute a serious breach of the legal order” (see Article 126o-126ui Sv). This does not 
require the existence of a concrete suspicion of a specific crime; an abstract suspicion of 
abstract serious crimes suffices. Moreover, the use of these powers is not in any respect 
limited to suspects. The possibility to apply these powers in the event of “planning” serious 
organized crime implies that the police force is authorized to investigate pro-actively. 
Interestingly, the powers may also be utilized when the planning as such is not in violation 
of criminal law. When the planning does constitute a criminal offence, however (see for 
example Article 46 on criminal preparation, and the provisions on conspiracy in, e.g., 
Articles 80, 96, 103, 114b, 120b, 122, 176b, 282c, 289a, 304b, 415b Sr), special 
investigative powers can be applied on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of that concrete 
crime (i.e., on the basis of Articles 126g-126ni Sv).  
 
B. Actors in Criminal Process 
a. The courts and judges 
The judiciary deals with criminal law offences within the criminal law divisions of each of 
the nineteen District Courts (rechtbanken), five Courts of Appeal (gerechtshoven), and the 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden), which is a court of cassation.43 The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands does not have a Constitutional Court. Furthermore, each 
District Court has a number of sub-district venues; there are 61 of these so called Cantonal 
Courts (kantongerechten) in total. Generally, the sub-district courts only handle minor 
offences, mostly infractions (overtredingen) (see Article 382 Sv). Most crimes (misdrijven) 
and all other offences are dealt with by a District Court. The Supreme Courts only decides 
on points of law and procedural matters; all the district and appeal courts also examine and 
establish the facts. Criminal cases are decided by professional judges (or justices, in the 
Courts of Appeal and in the Supreme Court). Serious offences are dealt with by a panel of 
                                                 
43 See the Judicial Organization Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie). See for information on the organization A.F.M. Brenninkmeijer, 
Juridical Organization, in: J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver & E.H. Hondius, Introduction to Dutch Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006, p. 53-61; see also <http://www.rechtspraak.nl> (website is partly in English). 
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three judges; less serious offences that are simple in nature and that carry a punishment of 
no more than one year of imprisonment can be tried by a single District Court judge 
(Politierechter) (see Articles 368-369 Sv).  
The Dutch system does not make use of laymen or juries,44 and even for those in the legal 
professions it is not especially easy to become a judge (or prosecutor). First of all one needs 
to posses an outstanding master’s degree in law. After that there are two alternative routes 
to becoming a judge (or prosecutor). One possibility is to apply for a position in the training 
programmeme for judges (and prosecutors), called the RAIO training. Applicants can enter 
the programmeme only after they have passed a battery of tough intelligence and 
psychological tests and several interviews. The programme normally takes six years and it 
offers a combination of theory and practice. Only after successfully completing the training 
programme are the participants appointed as assistant judges (or prosecutors) with one of 
the District Courts. After satisfactorily fulfilling that position for about a year one can be 
appointed a judge for life (or prosecutor for unlimited time) by Royal Decree (see Article 
117 of the Constitution). Another possibility is offered to legal professionals (e.g., 
attorneys, company lawyers, academics, civil servants) who have at least six years of 
relevant job experience. They can apply for the position of judge (or prosecutor) in case of 
a vacancy at one of the courts (or prosecuting offices). Candidates who are selected are 
hired as assistant judges (or prosecutors) and enter a training programme to become a 
professional judge (or prosecutor). Depending on previous experience the programme takes 
about a year to eighteen months. Although judges are appointed for life (and prosecutors 
for unlimited time), at the age of 70 they are honourable discharged from their function.  
The pre-trial phase can involve an important task for the investigative judge (rechter-
commissaris) (see Articles 170 ff Sv). The pre-trial investigation is chiefly inquisitorial 
rather than adversarial in nature.45 This applies to a greater extent to the police investigation 
than to the judicial preliminary investigation (gerechtelijk vooronderzoek; see Articles 181-
241c Sv) which is conducted by and at the orders of the investigative judge. The judicial 
preliminary investigation is initiated by the investigative judge at the request of the 
prosecutor. The investigative judge was introduced into the Dutch system to provide an 
                                                 
44 In military criminal cases, however, a high military officer takes a place in the court. 
45 See C.H. Brants-Langeraar, Consensual Criminal Procedures, in J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet (eds), Netherlands reports to the 
Seventeenth International Congress of Comparative Law, Utrecht 2006,  Antwerpen / Oxford: Intersentia, section 1; also published in: vol. 11.1 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (May 2007), section 1, on: <http://www.ejcl.org/111/art111-6.pdf>. 
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impartial, objective investigator in an early stage of criminal law proceedings. If more 
serious offences are involved he or she usually does play a role in the pre-trial 
investigation, even if only a police investigation takes place because no judicial preliminary 
investigation has been initiated. 
First of all, the investigative judge reviews the legality of police custody 
(inverzekeringstelling) after three days and fifteen hours at the latest (Article 59a Sv; cf. 
Article 5 § 3 ECHR), and apart from that he or she is authorized to order a remand in 
custody (voorlopige hechtenis) (Article 63 Sv). Furthermore, in principle the investigative 
judge is the authority who authorizes or orders, for example: seizure (Article 104 Sv), 
search of homes and other places (Article 110 Sv), a criminal financial investigation 
(Article 126 Sv), and recording communication (Articles 126l and 126m Sv). He or she can 
execute several of these powers ex officio, especially if the pre-trial investigation has 
officially become a judicial preliminary investigation. Other important powers are 
questioning the suspect, witnesses, and experts. Unlike the prosecutor, the investigative 
judge can – in a judicial preliminary investigation – order the appearance of suspects and 
witnesses. He or she has, however, no power to decide on prosecution of the suspect: the 
prosecutor has a monopoly over the decision whether someone will be prosecuted and 
appear before a court; so the prosecution does not need leave from a judge or court to 
prosecute.  
In the actual trial (see Articles 282 ff Sv) the courts play a fairly active role. The court will 
strive to find the truth as regards the offences as these have been charged by the prosecutor 
in the so called tenlastelegging. In doing so it mainly bases its questions, findings and 
decisions on the presentation in the dossier of records of the evidence collected in the pre-
trial stages. The court sessions are not particularly suited to all kinds of investigation. If 
such investigations are required or if the court deems it preferable otherwise, the case will 
be referred to the investigative judge in the pre-trial phase for further investigation (Article 
316 Sv). Nevertheless, the court itself interrogates the accused during the hearing (Article 
286 Sv). Furthermore, the court questions witnesses and experts (Article 292 Sv) insofar as 
they are present at trial (most of them will already have had definitive hearings in the pre-
trial phase before the police and the investigative judge; written transcripts of their 
statements are set down in official records and placed in the case file). Furthermore, the 
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court can, for example, ex officio order the prosecutor to summon witnesses and experts to 
appear in court (Article 263 Sv).  
The trial hearing is slightly more adversarial than inquisitorial. To a greater extent than in 
the pre-trial phase there is equality of arms as between the defence and the prosecutor. The 
defence can comment on the legality and quality of the case file and the evidence presented 
in court, on the prosecutor’s charge and the sentence proposed, and on the facts of the case. 
The defence, however, has few possibilities to demand rehearing of witnesses or experts 
and to demand or present additional evidence during the court session. Apart from 
exercising (somewhat limited) powers to discover truth, the court has a responsibility to 
guard due process. It assesses the legality and quality of the evidence presented in the case 
file and by the prosecutor during the court session, and it must guarantee that the trial is fair 
and that the process is completed within reasonable time.  
 
b. The Public Prosecution Service 
The Openbaar Ministerie (literally: public ministry) is the Public Prosecution Service in 
The Netherlands.46 It is not a government department like the Ministry of Justice, but part 
of the Judiciary. As mentioned above, however, the Minister of Justice is politically 
accountable for the prosecution service, its actions and decisions. Hierarchically, the 
service is placed under the Minister. He or she has policymaking power, and may give 
binding instructions with regard to investigation and prosecution in individual cases. He or 
she can be held accountable in parliament for using or failing to use these powers.47 
Generally the Minister of Justice uses these powers in individual cases with great 
reservation. Within criminal procedure the prosecution might have to justify its actions 
before the investigative judge or the court.  
To qualify as a prosecutor one has to meet the same requirements as those that apply to 
judges (see supra sub 3Ba).The service is hierarchically organized internally. At the level 
of first instance there is a prosecution office (arrondissementsparket) attached to every one 
of the nineteen District Courts. These district offices are composed of several prosecutors 
(officieren van justitie) and a head prosecutor (hoofdofficier van justitie). One level up there 
                                                 
46 On the Openbaar Ministerie, see Peter Tak, The Dutch Prosecution Service, in: Peter J.P. Tak (ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution 
Services in the EU Member States, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, p. 355-383; and < http://www.om.nl> (website is partly in English). 
47 Peter Tak, The Dutch Prosecution Service, in: Peter J.P. Tak (ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member 
States, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, p. 374-375. 
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is an office (resortsparket) attached to all of the five Courts of Appeal. The prosecutors 
here (called advocaten-generaal) conduct criminal cases in appeal. They are placed 
hierarchically under the head prosecutor (hoofdadvocaat-generaal). Furthermore the 
Prosecution Service has a national prosecution office (landelijk parket) that deals with 
(inter)national organised crime and terrorism, and functional offices (functioneel parket) 
that specialize in environmental crime, economic crime and fraud. All the district, appeal 
and national offices are placed under the national Board of procurators general (College 
van procureurs-generaal) that has its seat in The Hague (Parket Generaal). The Board 
monitors the prosecutors and their actions and decisions in individual cases, for example 
those on prosecution, and issues policy directives (beleidsregels or richtlijnen) concerning 
criminal procedure.  
The main tasks of the prosecution service are: investigating criminal offences, prosecuting 
offenders, and executing sentences. With regard to all these tasks it has a responsibility to 
protect the rights of both victims and offenders. According to the Code of Conduct of the 
Prosecution Service (Gedragscode Openbaar Ministerie),48 prosecutors will execute their 
tasks “with special attention to fundamental human rights” (Rule 1.2), “with respect to the 
inherent human dignity, without distinction as to person or status, and without 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, sex, sexual inclination, national origin, ethnicity, 
skin colour, age or on any other grounds” (Rule 1.3) and in “a fair, impartial, objective and 
fearless manner” (Rule 1.4). This is also of importance in criminal investigation by the 
police. Since the prosecutor owns command over criminal investigation (see Article 148 
Sv) and has authority over the police (Article 13 Police Act), he or she is obliged to ensure 
that the police force is working in conformity with criminal procedure law and ensures the 
fundamental rights of individuals.49 The prosecutor can instruct the police in these maters 
as well as on the pursuit of specific investigations. This, however, does not alter the fact 
that the prosecutor depends on the police to provide information.  
On the basis of the criminal investigation the prosecutor decides whether a case should be 
brought to court and which offences will be charged. The public prosecution service has a 
monopoly on the prosecution of individuals and legal entities. Individuals have no right to 
                                                 
48 Adopted 11 July 2005 by the Board of procurators general. 
49 Cf. Barry Hancock & Egbert Myjer (eds), Human Rights Manual for Prosecutors (by the International Association of Prosecutors), Nijmegen: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2002, which offers a survey of relevant international human rights standards and instruments. 
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initiate a criminal trial; victims can, however, join the criminal trial by submitting a claim 
for damages against the suspect.50 In The Netherlands, what is called principle of 
expediency applies: the prosecution service is not obliged to prosecute every crime of 
which it becomes aware (as it would have to do under the principle of legality), but it can 
decide not to prosecute if a conviction might not be obtainable or if “reasons of public 
interest” do not favour prosecution (see Article 167 CPC).51 The prosecutor has several 
options if he or she decides not to bring a case to court by filing charges against the 
suspect.52 He or she can dismiss the case unconditionally (onvoorwaardelijk sepot; see 
Article 167 § 2 or Article 242 § 2 Sv) or conditionally (voorwaardelijke sepot; see Article 
167 § 2, Article 244 § 3 or Article 245 § 3 Sv). A sort of conditional dismissal is also 
offered with the so called transaction (transactie; Articles 74-74c Sv): the suspect can 
prevent prosecution and a trial by meeting conditions laid down by the prosecutor. In most 
cases the condition will be the payment by the culprit of a sum of money to the state which 
can be as great as the maximum fine carried by the offence.53 The transactional settlement 
can be applied to all infractions and all crimes that carry a maximum punishment of six 
years imprisonment. If the suspect does not meet the transactional conditions he will be 
summoned to trial. Over 30% of the criminal cases in The Netherlands are settled through a 
transaction. The legislator aims to replace the transaction gradually with a procedure of 
“prosecution through penal orders” (OM afdoening door strafbeschikking), which was 
introduced on 1 February 2008 in Article 257a Sv: the prosecutor imposes a criminal 
punishment on the suspect.54 This procedure can be applied to offences that carry a 
maximum punishment of no more than six years’ imprisonment. The penal order is 
considered a prosecution. By accepting the punishment the suspect admits to being guilty 
of the offence. The order has the same legal status as a judgment by a court. The prosecutor 
can order: community service (taakstraf) with a maximum of 180 hours; a fine (boete); 
withdrawal from society (onttrekking aan het verkeer); payment to the state for the victim; 
disqualification from driving (ontzegging van de rijbevoegdheid). The prosecutor is not 
                                                 
50 See on the role of the victim in the Dutch criminal justice system M.E.I. Brienen & E.H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal 
Justice Systems, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2000, p. 666-671. 
51 See for greater detail Peter Tak, The Dutch Prosecution Service, in: Peter J.P. Tak (ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in 
the EU Member States, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, p. 367-369. 
52 See also sub 4.B. 
53 See for greater detail on the transaction Peter J. P. Tak, The Dutch criminal justice system, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008, p. 87-
88. 
54 See C.H. Brants-Langeraar, Consensual Criminal Procedures, in J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet (eds), Netherlands reports to the 
Seventeenth International Congress of Comparative Law, Utrecht 2006,  Antwerpen / Oxford: Intersentia, section 4.4; also published in: vol. 
11.1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (May 2007), section 1, on: <http://www.ejcl.org/111/art111-6.pdf>. 
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authorized to order a sentence entailing deprivation of liberty. The strafbeschikking is also 
discussed below in 4Bb and 5Bg. 
Persons – such as victims – who have a direct interest in a prosecutor’s decision not to 
bring a case to court may file a complaint under Article 12 Sv with the competent Court of 
Appeal. If the court is of the opinion that a court prosecution should have taken place it can 
order the prosecutor to initiate one. This is rather exceptional.  
In addition to the police The Netherlands is familiar with four special criminal investigation 
services (bijzondere opsporingsdiensten) with their own pre-trial investigative and 
evidence-gathering powers.55 They all work under the supervision and instruction of the 
prosecutor. Their power to investigate crime is limited to the policy area for which they are 
appointed. In principle they have the same investigative powers as police investigators (cf. 
Article 142 Sv). The investigations of these services can (and often will) result in a 
prosecution by the prosecution services. In the area of tax the Fiscal Information and 
Investigation Service & Economic Investigation Service (Fiscale inlichtingen- en 
opsporingsdienst & Economische controledienst; FIOD-ECD) investigates fraud and tax. 
Furthermore, the Social Intelligence and Investigation Service (Sociale Inlichtingen- en 
Opsporingsdienst; SIOD) investigates offences in the field of social security. Crime related 
to agriculture, nature, food quality and animal wellbeing is combated by the General 
Inspection Service (Algemene inspectiedienst, AID). Finally, the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie van VROM) has its own Intelligence and 
Tracing Service (Inlichtingen- en Opsporings Dienst, VROM IOD) to investigate serious – 
often organized – crime in this policy field. 
Apart from the decision on laying charges, the prosecutor is also responsible for presenting 
the dossier and the evidence therein to the court. In the Dutch criminal justice system, 
evidence gathered in the pre-trial phase by police, prosecutor, investigative judge or 
defence is not subject to any special procedure by which the evidence has to be granted 
leave to go to court. In case the exclusion of evidence is indicated because it has been 
obtained unlawfully (see infra sub 4.G) this will be decided by the court at trial. In 
principle, all evidence might be employed in criminal cases. The use of evidence obtained 
                                                 
55 See the 2006 Act on special investigation services (Wet op de bijzondere opsporingsdiensten). 
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abroad (extraterritorial use of evidence) is also allowed, in principle under the same 
conditions as other evidence.  
 
c. The defence lawyer 
To become a defence lawyer one first of all needs a master’s degree in law. With that it is 
possible to apply to a law firm to become a trainee lawyer. Trainees have to work in 
practice and attend a programme of courses for at least three years before they are 
unconditionally accepted as a member of the Dutch bar. If accepted by a law firm, they 
automatically have the right to appear and conduct proceedings in court in criminal cases. 
Pursuant to the 1952 Act on Advocates (Advocatenwet), defence lawyers are required to 
become a member of The Netherlands Bar Association (Nederlandse orde van 
advocaten).56 This association does not have special divisions for criminal law or other 
fields of law, nor does it function as a Public Defender’s Office. The latter is an institute 
with which The Netherlands is not familiar; all attorneys in The Netherlands are entitled to 
conduct the defence in criminal cases (as well as civil ones) (see Article 11 Act on 
Advocates).  
The conduct of defence lawyers is first of all mentioned in Article 46 of the Act on 
Advocates. More detailed regulations are offered in the Dutch 1992 Code of Conduct 
(Gedragsregels 1992) and in the Code of Conduct for lawyers in the European Union (most 
recently amended in 2002). Misconduct can be sanctioned through disciplinary law. The 
sanctions are: a warning; a reprimand; a one year maximum suspension; expulsion (Article 
48 Act on Advocates).  
The main role of the defence lawyer is to consult with and assist the client during all stages 
of criminal law proceedings. This means that the lawyer shall represent the points of view 
of the clients and that he or she shall exercise the rights of the defence and make use of all 
possibilities within the bounds of the law to achieve the client’s interests. The defence 
lawyer is not, however, allowed to pursue the defence contrary to the apparent wishes of 
the client, the accused.57 To that extent the suspect is “dominus litis” of the defence in 
criminal law proceedings in The Netherlands. At the same time the defence lawyer assumes 
                                                 
56 On the Bar, see < http://www.advocatenorde.nl> (website is partly in English). 
57 On the role and duties of criminal defence lawyers, see Ties Prakken & Taru Spronken, The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in 
the Netherlands, in: Ed Cape et al. (eds), Suspects in Europe, Antwerp / Oxford, Intersentia, p. 174-177; and Taru Spronken, Reflections on a 
European Charter for Criminal Defence Lawyers, Deventer: Kluwer 2003, p. 56-58. 
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full responsibility for the handling of a case. In case the advocate has a difference of 
opinion with his client concerning the way in which the case should be handled, and this 
dispute cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the advocate shall withdraw (Rule 9 
Code of Conduct). The defence lawyer is regarded as the inseparable, partisan 
representative of the client. He or she has no obligation to actively gather and introduce 
evidence to support the client’s case, although it might be wise for him or her to do so. 
Persons who might expect that they will be prosecuted may request the investigative judge 
to conduct investigations in their case (mini-instructie; Article 36a Sv). The same right 
accrues to their lawyers (Article 36e Sv). The defence, however, does not have a duty to 
assist the course of justice whatsoever. What is more, the Dutch system is not acquainted 
with such legal constructs as “obstruction of justice” and “contempt of court”. 
Nevertheless, lawyers must abstain from adversely affecting the lawful discovery of the 
truth by the judicial authorities.  
 
C. Investigation of the Facts (truth finding) 
In criminal procedure in The Netherlands, the emphasis in regard to establishing the facts 
of a criminal case clearly lie in the pre-trial procedure. Commonly, little new evidence is 
presented during the court procedure. The investigation of the facts, truth finding and the 
gathering of evidence both against and in favour of the suspect is first of all the 
responsibility of the police, under the supervision of the prosecutor. The prosecutor 
presents the dossier and the evidence therein to the court. The court will judge the case 
mainly on that basis and on the assessment and discussion in court between the prosecutor 
and defence about the evidence and legal aspects of the case. The court judges are 
acquainted with the case prior to the trial and they examine the dossier thoroughly before 
the trial actually starts. During the court session the judges briefly discuss all the main 
evidence, and some of it in greater detail if it is unclear or in dispute. The Court actively 
assesses the legally and quality of the evidence in the dossier by questioning the defendant 
about it. If the court considers that evidence has been obtained illegally it might exclude it 
(cf. infra sub 4.G). Witnesses and experts will only be questioned by the trial court itself if 
the prosecutor – ex officio or at the request of the defence – has summoned witnesses to 
appear in court or if it is deemed necessary by the court to hear a witness. Usually, 
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however, the case will then be sent back to the investigative judge, to enable him or her to 
rehear certain witnesses. The reports of these hearings will then be added to the file. 
 
D. Appeal, Cassation, and Revision  
In case of crimes (misdrijven) the system of remedies (rechtsmiddelen) always allows for 
an appeal to a Court of Appeal at the request of the prosecution as well as at the request of 
the defence if the defendant was not completely acquitted of all charges (Article 404 Sv). 
The same applies to infractions (overtredingen), albeit in that case some extra restrictions 
on the defence apply: they cannot appeal if either no criminal penalty was imposed or if the 
defendant was fined less than € 50. What is more: in that case the defence in principle 
cannot enter an appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court either. Yet another, extra 
obstacle to an appeal is provided in Article 410a Sv: in cases in which the prosecution or 
defence appeals against infractions or less serious crimes, while the court in first instance 
imposed a penalty of no more than € 500, the appeal will only be granted by the Court of 
Appeal if this is necessary for the course of justice. An appeal normally has to be made 
within fourteen days after the judgment in first instance has been rendered (Article 408 Sv).  
On the nature of the appeal trial, see infra sub 5.D. 
After the appeal proceedings have been concluded, both the prosecution and defence can 
appeal on points of law only via the remedy of cassation to the Supreme Court (see supra 
sub 3.B.a.). This is a court of cassation; The Kingdom of the Netherlands does not have a 
Constitutional Court. The possibility to appeal in cassation is limited in a somewhat similar 
fashion as the remedy of appeal (see Article 427 Sv58). There is however no equivalent to 
Article 410a Sv for cassation. The final result of cassation can be adverse to the defendant. 
Since the prosecution can enter an appeal in cassation against an acquittal, this can also 
mean that an acquittal (vrijspraak) or dismissal of all charges (ontslag van alle 
rechtsvervolging) after cassation is reversed to a guilty verdict and punishment. 
Miscarriages of justice should as far as possible be redressed with the ordinary remedies of 
appeal and cassation. In favour of the defendant, however, Dutch criminal procedure law 
does under specific circumstances allow closed cases to be reopened by revision 
(herziening) of criminal judgments having power of res judicata (see Article 457 Sv). At 
                                                 
58 Cassation is furthermore limited in Article 80 § 2 Judicial Organization Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie) with regard to judgments by 
sub-district courts (i.e., Cantonal Courts (kantongerechten); see supra 3.B.a.). 
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present three grounds are offered for revision (see for the future however, infra sub 4.F.). 
Revision is first of all possible if different court decisions are incompatible with each other. 
Secondly, a closed criminal procedure can be reopened if a new fact (novum) makes it 
likely that, had the trial court known that fact, it would have taken a fundamentally 
different decision, which would have been more favourable to the convicted person. 
Finally, revision can be granted if the European Court of Human Rights has established in a 
judgment that the ECHR has been violated in the proceedings that led to the conviction and 
revision is necessary with a view to redressing that violation.59  
 
E. An adversarial or inquisitorial system? 
As opposed to Anglo-American adversarial system of criminal procedure, a Continental 
system is recognized which is inquisitorial in nature and which is applied, e.g., in most of 
the non-English speaking European countries. Within this dichotomy, criminal procedure in 
The Netherlands – being a Continental European state – must indeed be characterised as 
inquisitorial.60 However, this qualification is not quite meaningful, since neither of these 
systems exists in a pure form, and because there are many differences, even between 
continental systems.  
In the Dutch criminal justice system the pre-trial investigation phase is largely inquisitorial 
in nature. The collection of evidence and fact finding is mainly done by the authorities: the 
police force investigates under the prosecutor’s and/or the investigative judge’s 
supervision. In this phase of criminal procedure the suspect figures mainly as a subject of 
investigation and he or she is exposed to undergo all kinds of coercive powers. Of course 
the culprit can contest the actions of the authorities when he is heard to that end or via 
possible remedies, and he or she can instigate investigations as well, but the system is not 
constructed in such a way that the defence is as responsible for truth finding as the 
authorities. For one thing, the possibilities for investigations at the instigation of the 
defence offered in the Code of Criminal Procedure mostly go via the authorities: for 
example, the defence may request the investigative judge to conduct investigations in their 
                                                 
59 See P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, Heropening van procedures na veroordelingen door het EHRM. (Reopening of Procedures after 
Judgements by the European Court of Human Rights), Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003, p. 106-146 and p. 541-542 of the summary in 
English; T. Barkhuysen, M.L. van Emmerik & P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen (eds.), The Execution of Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights 
Decisions in the National Legal Order, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
60 See in more detail on this subject Peter J. van Koppen & Steven Penrod, Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice: Psychological Perspectives 
on Criminal Justice Systems (Perspectives in Law & Psychology), New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003, with a lot of 
contributions on The Netherlands. 
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case (mini-instructie; see supra sub 3.B.c.), DNA-counter-expertise goes via the prosecutor, 
and if the defence wishes expert investigations the investigative judge will appoint an 
expert to assist him or her in the investigation. Moreover, there is no equality of arms 
whatsoever during the pre-trial investigation between the prosecution and the defence. This 
is most obvious if the newly introduced procedure of “prosecution through penal orders” 
(OM afdoening door strafbeschikking) is applied (see sub 3.B.b., 4.B.b. and 5.B.g).  
The balance is considerably different in the trial phase, which is of a moderately accusatory 
and adversarial nature. Nevertheless, it is the court (i.e., the chairman) that leads the 
proceedings and presents the evidence and investigation results in the dossier at trial and 
actively questions the defendant, witnesses and experts. However, both the prosecution and 
the defence can contest everything that is presented in court, give their own view on the 
case and the evidence, and question the defendant, witnesses and experts for themselves. 
The position of the prosecution and defence is much more one of equality of arms. As far as 
the trial in appeal is concerned, the procedure has become much more adversarial: the 
scope and content of the hearing in this procedural phase now depend very much on what 
the prosecution and defence bring forward for discussion (see infra section 5.D.). 
So in my opinion the Dutch system is largely inquisitorial in the pre-trial investigation 
phase and moderately accusatory and adversarial during the trial. Since the trial phase is 
strongly guided by the dossier as it was constructed in the pre-trial investigation, when 
qualifying the nature of criminal procedure in The Netherlands the pre-trial proceedings 
have to weigh rather more than the trial phase. Therefore, on a continuum of 1 to 10 (1 is 
strictly adversarial; 10 is strictly inquisitorial), I would rate the essential nature of the 
criminal procedure as a whole with a 6 for The Netherlands, i.e., it is a tempered form of 
inquisitorial proceedings. Given that only a few fundamental rights demand adversariality – 
this applies especially to the right to examine witnesses for and against the defendant (cf. 
Article 6 § 3 (d) ECHR) –as such, of course, this says little about whether or not the system 
applies high human rights standards, if only because accurate truth-discovery is a 
prerequisite to a case outcome that is fair to all involved. In regard to The Netherlands, I 
would even say that the tempered inquisitorial nature of the Dutch system is generally 
speaking well counterbalanced by a moderately active judicial protection of fundamental 
rights.  
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4. HUMAN RIGHTS IN DUTCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
 
A. Fundamental Rights Independent of Fair Trial 
a. The right to life 
The death penalty was abolished in The Netherlands in 1870. Article 114 of the 
Constitution declares that capital punishment may not be imposed. So far there has not been 
any serious discussion in or outside parliament about reintroducing this punishment. This 
negative obligation on the state of course protects the right to life. Dutch law does not, 
however, expressly provide for the protection of life by a positive obligation on the state to 
instigate criminal investigations if reliable information points to a life threatening situation, 
or to start a criminal investigation if someone has been killed under suspicious 
circumstances and prosecute and punish perpetrators. Such positive obligations do, 
however, stem from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to 
life in Article 2 ECHR.61 
 
b. The right to be protected against cruel and humiliating treatment 
The prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment as such is not provided for 
in a statute. A broader right is contained in the constitution, however, Article 11 of which 
states: “Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of his person, without prejudice to 
restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.” So this constitutional right is 
not absolute. However, Article 3 ECHR, which applies in full in The Netherlands, is. What 
is more, although this provision literally only involves a negative obligation on the state, 
the European Court has managed to formulate similar positive obligations on the basis of 
Article 3 ECHR, as it was able to construct an obligation regarding the right to life in 
Article 2 ECHR.62 So inhuman treatment by both the authorities and private persons must 
be investigated, prosecuted and properly punished. 
                                                 
61 See e.g., ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 28 October 1998, Osman v The United Kingdom; ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 24 October 2002, 
Mastromatteo v Italy; ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 15 May 2007, Ramzahai v The Netherlands; ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 30 November 2004, 
Öneryildiz v Turkey. Highly critical of this is P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, Repressie door mensenrechten. Over positieve verplichtingen tot 
aanwending van strafrecht ter bescherming van fundamentele rechten (Repression by Human Rights. On Positive Obligations to Apply 
Criminal Law to Ensure Fundamental Rights), Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008.  
62 See e.g., ECtHR 24 January 2008, Maslova & Nalbandov v Russia); ECtHR 3 May 2007, Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v 
Georgia; ECtHR 12 October 2006, Mubilanzila Mayeka & Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium; ECtHR 4 December 2003, M.C. v Bulgaria. 
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Interrogation and the prohibition against ill-treatment 
With regard to interrogations, Article 29 Sv contains an important safeguard against 
pressuring suspects: any official who interrogates a suspect is obliged to refrain from 
anything that aims at obtaining a statement from the suspect of which it cannot be 
ascertained that it is given freely. So statements – and confessions alike – must be voluntary 
and may not be obtained through the use of force, threats, or promises (on the consequences 
of ill-treatment during interrogation of the suspect, see infra sub 4.G.). Prior to 
interrogation, suspects need to be instructed that they are under no obligation to answer the 
questions posed (cf. infra sub 4.B.f.). During interrogations suspects without an adequate 
command of the Dutch language have a right to an interpreter (see infra sub section 4.B.i). 
The moment someone has become a suspect he or she has a right to freely choose an 
attorney (Articles 28 and 39 Sv). However, during the preliminary investigation phase, the 
right to have counsel present does not in principle apply during the first period of 
questioning (called the ophouding voor onderzoek),63 which is set at a maximum of six 
hours (cf. infra sub 5.B.b.). This does not imply that immediately thereafter the suspect has 
a right to be provided with legal aid by the state. Counsel shall in principle only be assigned 
in the event of police custody (inverzekeringstelling) or remand (voorlopige hechtenis), i.e., 
remand in custody (bewaring), continuation of remand detention by court order 
(gevangenhouding), or taking into remand detention by court order (gevangenneming).64 If 
some form of deprivation of liberty by remand is applied, the accused will also be assigned 
counsel during the trial in first instance and in appeal (Article 41 Sv).65 If the culprit is not 
deprived of his liberty he or she can nevertheless request legal aid. There is no statutory 
right to have counsel present during police interrogation. However in case of interrogation 
by the prosecutor or by the investigative judge, in principle a lawyer has to be admitted 
(Article 57 and 186a Sv). The police, prosecutor and investigative judge at present have no 
general obligation to make audio or video recordings of their interrogations (however, cf. 
infra sub 5.B.b.).  
 
                                                 
63 For a critical view of this, see The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT), Report to the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the visits carried out in June 2007, Strasbourg, 5 February 2008, Part I, 
para. 21-22. 
64 On these forms of deprivation of liberty, see infra sub 4.A.c. 
65 As for juveniles, see Article 489 Sv. 
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Detention and the prohibition of ill-treatment 
Detention can easily result in cruel and humiliating treatment and punishment of those who 
are deprived of their liberty. The requirement and applicable procedures for deprivation of 
liberty in the pre-trial phase and during trial are laid down in Articles 52-88 Sv. The 
detention regime and the norms that apply during detention are regulated primarily by the 
1998 Penitentiary Principles Act (Penitentiaire beginselenwet), the Penitentiary Measure 
(Penitentiaire maatregel), the 1994 Police Service Guidelines (Besluit beheer regionale 
politiekorpsen), the 1994 Official instruction for the police, Royal military police and other 
investigation officials (Ambtsinstructie66) and the rules of the specific detention facility.67 
Although the state is not obliged to inform detainees of their rights, it does of course have 
the duty to ensure them. 
An important safeguard against ill-treatment in detention is the possibility that the detainee 
can inform people outside prison about his or her deprivation of liberty. After arrest the 
suspect can contact a lawyer if he or she has one. If this is not the case one can only be 
contacted after the suspect has been taken into custody or remand, since in that case one 
will be provided. An arrested person has no statutory right to contact family members or 
others. The 1994 Official instruction for the police, Royal military police and other 
investigation officials declares, however, that at the detainee’s request the authorities shall 
inform a family member or housemate as soon as possible if this does not infringe the 
interests of criminal investigation. This requirement has however still not been 
implemented properly.68 If necessary, the detainee should be provided with a doctor and 
medical care. Mail between an attorney and a detainee is in principle privileged, but other 
mail may be censored if necessary. Exactly which rights a detainee has depends on the 
interests of the investigation into the case, on the severity of the case, and on the detainee 
him-/herself. The most restricted, severe regime is applied in Extra high security level 
                                                 
66 Besluit houdende regels met betrekking tot een nieuwe Ambtsinstructie voor de politie, de Koninklijke marechaussee en de buitengewoon 
opsporingsambtenaar en de maatregelen waaraan rechtens van hun vrijheid beroofde personen kunnen worden onderworpen (Decree on 
rules relating to a new Official Instruction to the police, the Royal Military Police and those with extraordinary detective powers and the 
measures under which persons can legally be deprived of their liberty). 
67 On prison law in The Netherlands, see Constantijn Kelk, The Netherlands, in: Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder Dünkel (eds.), Imprisonment 
Today and Tomorrow. International Perspectives on Prisoners’ Rights and Prison Conditions, The Hague/ London/Boston, Kluwer Law 
International 2001, p. 478-507; Peter J. P. Tak, The Dutch criminal justice system, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008, p. 139-170; 
<http://www.dji.nl> (website is partly in English). 
68 See CPT, Report to the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the visits carried out in June 2007, Strasbourg, 5 February 2008, 
Part I, para. 20. 
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prisons (extra beveiligde inrichtingen), which house suspected terrorists, extremely 
dangerous persons and detainees who present an extremely high escape risk.69  
Any detainee may complain against any decision (or the refusal to take one) by or on behalf 
of the prison warden (see Articles 60 to 73 Penitentiary Principles Act). This thus also 
provides the opportunity to point at possible violations of fundamental prisoners’ rights. 
Complaints are filed with the complaints committee (beklagcomissie) at the prison facility. 
The committee can declare the complaint inadmissible, ill-founded or well-founded. If the 
complaint is well-founded the prison wardens’ decision will be annulled, and the committee 
can order the warden to take a new one. Both the detainee and the warden have the right to 
appeal against the decision by the complaints committee to an appeal committee 
(beroepscommissie) appointed by the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice 
and Youth Protection (Raad voor strafrechtstoepassing en jeugdbescherming). Besides 
that, complaints can be made to the national Ombudsman.  
 
c. Pre-sentence deprivation of liberty and Habeas Corpus 
The first period of police questioning (ophouding voor onderzoek; Article 61 Sv) of a 
suspect is set at a maximum of 6 hours. The hours between 12.00 am and 9.00 am are not 
counted, however, so the period can extend to 15 hours. It must be ordered by the 
prosecutor or a higher police officer (hulpofficier van justitie) and since it is applied to a 
suspect it requires a reasonable suspicion of the person questioned. After police questioning 
has ended the suspect should be released or taken into police custody at the order of the 
prosecutor or superior police officer. Police custody (inverzekeringstelling; Article 57 Sv) 
is only possible in case of a reasonable suspicion of an offence for which pre-trial detention 
(voorlopige hechtenis) is allowed (see infra). It is limited to a maximum of 3 days, which 
period may be extended by another 3 days if this is urgently required. Not later than 3 days 
and 15 hours after arrest the suspect must be brought before the investigative judge (Article 
59a § 1 Sv). The judge will examine the lawfulness of the custody. This procedure aims to 
meet Habeas Corpus requirements, especially those of Article 5 § 4 ECHR. 
After a period of at most 6 days and 15 hours the investigative judge can order remand in 
custody (bewaring; Articles 63-64 Sv) for 14 days at the request of the prosecutor. The 
                                                 
69 The regime is criticised by the CPT, Report to the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the visits carried out in June 2007, 
Strasbourg, 5 February 2008, Part I, § 41-53. 
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facts or circumstances must show that there are serious indications (ernstige bezwaren) 
against the suspect. Remand in custody is thus not possible based only on reasonable 
suspicion (in ordinary cases anyway, unlike the case of suspicion of a terrorist crime – 
Article 67 § 4 Sv).  Since remand in custody constitutes the first form of pre-trial detention 
(the other two forms are continuation of remand detention by court order and taking into 
remand detention by court order) the following requirements have to be met as well. First, 
an order for pre-trial detention may only be issued in the event of: an offence which carries 
a maximum punishment of imprisonment for four years or more; an offence that is 
specifically listed, such as incitement to hatred, threat, and embezzlement; or if no 
permanent address or place of residence of the suspect can be established in The 
Netherlands and he or she is suspected of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment 
(Article 67 Sv). Second, an order for remand in custody can only be issued if there is a 
serious danger of absconding or if a serious consideration of public safety requires the 
immediate deprivation of liberty (Article 67a Sv). 
If the period of remand custody is ending and the requirements for pre-trial detention are 
still met, a subsequent prolongation of pre-trial detention may be ordered by the Regional 
Court in the form of an order for continuation of detention on remand (gevangenhouding) 
for a maximum duration of ninety days. Normally, therefore, a person has to be presented 
before the trial court within 110 days and 15 hours (that is: 15 hours (6 + 9) + 6 days (2 x 3) 
+ 14 days + 90 days) or released after that period has expired. If the trial has started within 
the period of 110 days and 15 hours, the order for remand detention will remain valid for 60 
days after the day of the court’s judgment. In terrorism cases (i.e., cases where the 
defendant is suspected of committing a terrorist crime; see Article 83 Sr) the maximum 
period of continuation of remand detention by court order before the trial starts may be 
extended up to two years (which sums to two years and 90 days). 
In case the trial has started while the suspect is not deprived of his liberty, the trial court 
can order the suspect to be taken into remand detention (gevangenneming). This constitutes 
the third form of pre-trial detention. The order to apply such detention will also remain 
valid for 60 days after the day of the court’s judgment. 
On every occasion when the investigative judge or the court decides to order or prolong 
custody or pre-trial detention, the defendant has the right to state his opinion. Furthermore, 
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he or she can always request the termination or suspension of pre-trail detention (Article 69 
§ 1 Sv). The rejection of such a request by the investigative judge cannot, however, be 
appealed. Moreover, the defendant cannot appeal an order by the investigative judge for 
remand in custody (bewaring). He or she may then request the court (i.e., the District 
Court) to end or suspend his detention. Such requests may be unlimited. The defendant has, 
however, the right to appeal only once to the Court of Appeal against the rejection by the 
court of such requests (Article 87 Sv). Article 71 Sv provides for the possibility to appeal a 
court order for continuation of remand detention (gevangenhouding) and a court order that 
the suspect will be taken into remand detention (gevangenneming). Furthermore, orders to 
extend remand detention may be appealed, too, but only if the defendant did not appeal any 
earlier order for (the extension of) remand detention. Finally, with regard to the suspension 
of pre-trial detention it is important to note that criminal procedure law does provide for 
release on bail in Article 80 Sv. At the request of the suspect or prosecutor, or ex officio, the 
judge can suspend pre-trial detention both unconditionally and subject to special conditions. 
Although bail can constitute such a condition, it is very seldom applied in the practise of 
Dutch criminal procedure. 
 
B. Fair Trial Rights 
a. Charge 
Although not required under any statute, anyone who is arrested must immediately be 
informed verbally of the reasons for the arrest (cf. Articles 5 § 2 ECHR, and 9 § 2 ICCPR). 
If the suspect is detained in police custody or pre-trial detention, the offences of which he is 
suspected will be contained in the detention orders. If a judicial preliminary investigation is 
conducted, the charge shall be stated as specifically as possible at the start of the 
investigation (Articles 181-182 Sv). The charge on which the trial will eventually be based 
(the tenlastelegging) shall be precisely described in the summons (dagvaarding) (Article 
261 Sv), which must be served on the defendant in principle 10 days before the start of the 
trial in court (Article 265 Sv). If the case comes up before a District Court judge sitting 
alone (Politierechter; see supra sub 3.B.a.) a term of 3 days applies (Article 370 Sv). These 
terms may be shortened if the defendant agrees. If the suspect is caught in the act, he or she 
can be brought to trial that same day (Article 375 Sv). The charge may be amended during 
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the trial in first instance as well as in appeal, provided that the charge in essence is about 
the same criminal fact as the original allegation (Article 313 Sv). 
 
b. The right to bring one’s case before a court 
As explained above (see supra sub 3.B..b), Dutch criminal procedure makes provision for 
settlement out of court. The transaction system encourages defendants to make use of these 
alternatives since the prosecutors’ punishment is usually less severe than either the sentence 
that will be requested in court or the sentence the court may be expected to hand down. 
Defendants do not as such have a right to be provided with legal aid by the state if they 
settle out of court (see supra sub 4.A.b.). They should, however, be provided with 
assistance if the prosecutor, by way of “prosecution through penal orders” (OM afdoening 
door strafbeschikking; Article 257a Sv), imposes on the suspect a punishment of 
community service, disqualification from driving, or a fine and/or a payment to the state for 
the victim of more than € 2000, or if he or she makes an order concerning the behaviour of 
the suspect (Article 257c Sv). In that case the defendant should also be heard. 
Defendants have no power to bring their criminal case before an independent and impartial 
criminal court, nor can they force the prosecution to prosecute them, given the monopoly 
on prosecution that the public prosecution service has (see supra sub 4.A.b.). If, however, 
the prosecutor imposes punishment on the suspect through the strafbeschikking of Article 
257a Sv, the defendant may object to the prosecutor about that punishment. The prosecutor 
then has to withdraw the punishment or bring the case before the District Court (Articles 
257e-257f Sv). The defendant’s objection has to be made within fourteen days. After that 
the opportunity to object to the prosecutor’s penal order is lost, and with it the possibility to 
have the case heard by the court. In addition, the remedy of objection can no longer be 
utilized if the defendant has voluntarily complied with the order, or if he or she has, while 
assisted by counsel, signed a written waiver to the right to object. 
 
c. Right to an independent and impartial tribunal 
Judges are appointed for life by Royal Decree (on the requirements for appointment, see 
3.B.a.). Within the system of law they have an independent and impartial position. Courts 
and judges do not answer to the Minister of Justice or to parliament. Conversely, the 
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minister has sole political responsibility for the functioning of the judiciary system as a 
whole. The introduction of the Council for the Judiciary on 1 January 2002 aimed to 
strengthen the independence of the courts.70 The Council does not form part of the 
executive branch but is regarded as being a body of the judiciary that is not charged with 
judiciary duties. It acts as an intermediary between the Minister of Justice and the courts 
with regard to the utilization of resources: the courts are only accountable to the Council, 
while in turn the Council reports to the Minister of Justice. The courts, however, are not 
answerable to the Council as to the content, tenor and effect of judicial decisions. Judges 
are reasonably well paid. They are appointed for life (i.e., until the age of 70). A judge can 
only be dismissed by the Supreme Court, for example if he or she is physically or mentally 
unable to fulfil the task or if he or she is convicted of a crime. This is very exceptional, 
since most judges will themselves resign if a dismissal procedure is threatened. 
In order to ensure the impartiality of every court Articles 512 to 518 Sv contain regulations 
on the challenge and exemption of judges. A judge may not hear a case if it might harm 
judicial impartiality. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
requirement of independence and impartiality in Article 6 § 1 ECHR is considered to be 
vital to the meaning of this requirement. So if a judge identifies a possible conflict of 
interest, bias, prejudice or an interest in the matter being decided, he or she has to recuse 
him or herself. Some of the most frequent reasons for a defendant’s challenge are earlier 
decisions of a judge in the same case or in a related one (for example a case of a co-
defendant) and the conduct or decisions of the judge during the session.71 Previous 
involvement in the case can constitute a reason why a judge cannot hear the case. For 
example, an earlier decision on pre-trial detention will in principle be an impediment.  
 
d. The reasonable time requirement 
On the basis of Article 6 § 1 ECHR and the rather casuistic jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the 
Supreme Court of The Netherlands has established some clear general guidelines regarding 
the right to have one’s case heard within a reasonable time.72 Roughly, a case in first 
                                                 
70 On the Council for the Judiciary, see M. Kuijer, The Blindfold of Lady Justice, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, p. 395-405. 
71 See Marijke ter Voert & Jos Kuppens, Schijn van partijdigheid rechters (Doubts about judicial impartiality), Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en 
Documentatiecentrum (WODC), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002, p. 83-84 of the summary in English. 
72 See HR, 17 June 2008, LJN BD2578 (HR = Hoge Raad (Supreme Court); LJN refers to the number of the case on <www.rechtspraak.nl>). 
See also HR, 3 October 2000, NJ 2000, 721, with case-note by J. de Hullu (NJ = Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (a journal on case-law); 2000 
presents the year; 721 presents the case number). 
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instance normally has to be concluded within two years after the moment the suspect was 
criminally charged. In appeal a judgment in principle must be rendered within two years 
after filing the appeal. However, if the suspect undergoes pre-trial detention or if the 
suspect fall under juvenile criminal law, a maximum period applies, usually of 16 months. 
Moreover, in the event of appeal to a Court of Appeal or appeal in cassation to the Supreme 
Court, the files of the case normally have to arrive at the appeal court no later than six 
months after filing the appeal. On the consequence of violation of the reasonable time 
requirement, see infra sub 4.G. 
 
e. The right to a public hearing and pronouncement of sentence 
Article 121 of the Constitution holds that, except in cases laid down by Act of Parliament, 
trials shall be held in public and judgments shall be pronounced in public. This applies 
equally to the media. Persons below the age of 18 are not generally admitted, however. 
According to Article 269 Sv the court can order that the hearing shall take place behind 
closed doors. The order can be taken ex officio as well as at the request of the prosecutor, 
defendant or any of the other participants in the trial, such as witnesses. Reasons for issuing 
such an order can be the interest of public morality, public order, state security, the interests 
of minors, respect for the personal life of the defendant or others (such as witnesses and 
victims), and to avoid obstruction of the course of justice. A special provision applies to 
juveniles: in their case, the trials shall be conducted behind closed doors (Article 495b Sv). 
However, the judgment in their cases will also be pronounced in public. The rights of the 
media are discussed further on (see sub 4.D.). 
 
f. Presumption of innocence 
Suspects have the right to remain silent. Prior to any interrogation of a person who must be 
considered a suspect the authorities need to caution that person that he or she is under no 
obligation to answer questions (cautie; Article 29 § 2 Sv). This applies equally during the 
pre-trial investigation stage and in court. A statement by the defendant that has been made 
without such prior caution may not be used in evidence against him or her, unless it can be 
considered that he or she shall not be harmed by the omission (cf. infra sub 4.G.).  
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A defendant’s refusal to give a statement cannot as such be used as evidence against him or 
her. However, in conformity with the case-law of the ECtHR, in situations which clearly 
call for an explanation from the accused, silence may be taken into account when assessing 
the persuasiveness of the evidence against him or her.73 The burden of proof rests 
completely with the prosecution. In ordinary criminal trials this cannot be reversed under 
any circumstances. However, in criminal procedures concerning offences of a somewhat 
administrative nature (such as traffic law, environmental law, and financial and tax law) 
defendants can sometimes beconfronted with a certain presumption of guilt, which they can 
attempt to refute. 
It is considered a breach of the Trias Politica principle on the separation of powers if 
politicians or important public officials make statements on individual cases that are before 
the courts. It might even constitute a violation of the presumption of innocence or the right 
to a fair trial in Article 6 ECHR. Under very exceptional circumstances this could lead a 
court to render the prosecution inadmissible (cf. infra sub 4.G.). Although such a situation 
has not occurred in The Netherlands so far, politicians increasingly seem to be less reserved 
about stating their opinion on cases on trial and on specific judgments. On the media, see 
infra sub 4.D.. 
 
g. The right to counsel 
All suspects (both minors and adults) have a right to assistance by counsel. This right does 
not apply during the initial police interrogation.74 As explained above, the Dutch legal 
system provides for legal aid for indigent defendants (see supra sub 4.A.b.). Many 
attorneys are of the opinion that the payment for handling such cases is inadequate. The 
right to counsel does not as such imply a right to an adequate defence. As noted before, the 
defence lawyer may not conduct the defence contrary to the apparent wishes of the client 
(see supra sub section 3.B.c.). So the defendant can make his wishes and views clear to his 
counsel at all times. If the defendant has counsel of his own, he or she can discharge him or 
her at all times and retain another defence lawyer. If the state has provided the accused with 
                                                 
73 Cf. HR, 3 June 1997, NJ 1997, 584; ECtHR 8 February 1996, Murray v The United Kingdom, §. 44-58. 
74 However, recent decisions by the European Court seem to imply that the presence of a lawyer during police questioning is a fundamental 
right and that there should be no exceptions. See ECtHR 27 November 2008, Salduz v Turkey, and ECtHR 11 December 2008, Panovits v 
Cyprus. 
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counsel, they can both request replacement of counsel by another defence lawyer (Article 
45 Sv).  
Several privileges apply between counsel and defendant. First of all the authorities have to 
respect client-attorney confidentiality (cf. Article 218 Sv). Tapping of telephone 
conversations or interception of defence lawyers’ e-mail is illegal, unless they are suspects 
themselves (cf. Article 126aa Sv).75 The premises of defence lawyers who are not 
themselves suspects may be subject to search and seizure, but letters and other documents 
that fall within the privilege of non-disclosure cannot be seized (Article 98 Sv). Even if the 
defendant is deprived of his or her liberty there is in principle free access between counsel 
and client. This means that counsel and client must be permitted to speak privately and 
correspond confidentially (Article 50 Sv). This must be realised under supervision of the 
prison authorities in order to prevent the detainee’s escape and to secure the safety of the 
lawyer, and within the rules of the penitentiary facility. Free access may furthermore not 
delay the criminal investigation. It may also be restricted if it will probably lead to the 
suspect’s hindering the investigation or the process of fact-finding, or to the revelation to 
him or her of information that has to remain confidential. 
During the pre-trial investigation the suspect has the right to be assisted by counsel when, 
for example, powers of search, inspection of premises, seizure, and the collection of DNA 
are being used, or if the suspect or witnesses are being questioned by the investigative 
judge. Although there is no statutory right to be informed about an upcoming search, 
inspection of premises or seizure, both the defendant and counsel may nevertheless be 
present during searches and inspections of premises if this does not interfere with the 
investigation (cf. Articles 99a and 193 Sv). If the defendant is not present during a search or 
inspection – for example because he is deprived of his liberty – counsel can substitute. The 
authorities, however, are not obliged to await the arrival of the lawyer or defendant. 
 
h. Adequate time for the preparation of the defence and the right to know and contest the 
evidence 
During pre-trial investigation (police investigation or judicial preliminary investigation) 
defendant and counsel are in principle granted full excess (interne openbaarheid) to all the 
                                                 
75 See HR, 10 April 1979, NJ 1979, 374, with case-note by Th.W. van Veen. 
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case documents if they so request (Articles 30 Sv). However, the investigative judge and 
the prosecutor are authorized to withhold particular documents from the defence in the 
interests of the investigation. If this is the case it must be drawn to the defendant’s 
attention. It is also possible to keep a police investigation or judicial preliminary 
investigation secret from suspects for some time. In that case, or if the defence has only 
restricted access to the dossier, all restrictions must be lifted as soon as the judicial 
preliminary investigation has ended, or when the defendant has received a notification that 
the case will go to trial (kennisgeving van verdere vervolging), or when the summons for 
the trial in first instance has been served, or when a penal order by the prosecution has been 
issued (see Article 33 Sv). (On the timely presentation of the charges, see supra sub 4.B.a.) 
If the suspect is in pre-trial detention this means that full access to the dossier will be 
granted at most 110 days and 15 hours after he or she was deprived of liberty (cf. supra sub 
4.A.c). However, in terrorism cases access to the dossier can be restricted or even totally 
denied for a maximum period of two years and 90 days (Article 66 § 3 and 30 § 2 Sv).  
Some sensitive information may be kept secret from the defence – and the trial judges – 
even during trial. Under strict conditions the law provides for a special procedure to 
guarantee the complete anonymity of threatened witnesses (bedreigde getuigen; Articles 
226a-226f Sv). Such procedure furthermore exists for witnesses whose identities cannot be 
revealed for reasons of state security, for example because they are agents of the General 
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) or Military Intelligence and Security Service 
(MIVD). These witnesses are so called covert witnesses (afgeschermde getuigen; Articles 
226m-226s Sv). The procedure for covert witnesses was introduced to make it easier to 
make use of intelligence as evidence in criminal trials. Although these procedures are 
applicable with regard to all kinds of offences and suspects, they can be of particular use in 
terrorist and criminal organization cases.  
Both threatened and covert anonymous witnesses will be heard by the investigative judge. 
The defence can put questions to the investigative judge that they would like put to the 
witness. The judge will only put these questions if answering them will not cause the 
identity of the witness to be revealed. The defence can appeal to the court against the 
decision of the investigative judge to keep the identity of a threatened witness secret and to 
question the witness in person (Article 226b Sv). The law does not provide for an appeal 
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against the decision to use the procedure for covert witnesses. Despite their anonymity, the 
statements of anonymous witnesses can used as evidence in court if the special procedures 
have been complied with. A conviction may not, however, be based either solely or to a 
decisive extent on anonymous statements. Apart from complete anonymity the law also 
provides for the possibility of partial witness anonymity: the witness will be questioned in 
the presence of the defence, but his or her name, address, age, profession etcetera will not 
be made public and the witness can wear a disguise (Article 190 Sv). Other information 
such as documents, the disclosure of which will constitute a threat to society, may also be 
kept secret, but cannot be used as evidence. 
During the pre-trial investigation phase (cf. supra sub 3.B.c.) and to some degree during the 
trial, too, the defence can have witnesses and experts called and heard, have experts 
investigate a particular aspect of the case, have a DNA-test counter-checked, produce 
documents and items of evidence, etcetera. The defence has a right to cross-examine 
witnesses and experts who have been called by the prosecution. The judge ultimately 
decides which information will be used as evidence. Apart from statements by anonymous 
witnesses, Dutch criminal procedure also admits hearsay testimony as evidence.76 
Permissible as evidence, furthermore, are witness statements that have been given by 
suspects or convicts in exchange for reduction of the sentence they might receive in their 
own case or already have received (toezeggingen aan getuigen in strafzaken). Such an 
agreement between the prosecutor and the witness must be in writing and is only 
permissible in serious organized crime cases (Articles 226g-226k Sv). It has to be approved 
by the investigative judge. If the statement could make or has made an important 
contribution to the criminal investigation or prosecution, the witness may in his or her own 
case receive: a reduction of a prison sentence of at most one third; replacement of a 
maximum one third of a prison sentence, or a fine, by a suspended sentence; replacement of 
no more than one third of a prison sentence by a fine (Article 44a Sr). The prosecution 
cannot commit itself to witness immunity. Finally, statements of suspects, witnesses and 
experts who have been questioned through a video and audio link, a so- called 
videoconference (videoconferentie; Articles 78a and 131a Sv), may be used as evidence. 
The court, investigative judge or official in charge of the hearing decides whether a 
                                                 
76 See HR 20 December 1926, NJ 1927, p. 85 (Testimonium de auditu). 
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videoconference will take place. The defendant or his or her counsel may first respond to 
the proposal. The decision to use videoconferencing is not open to appeal. 
 
i. The right to an interpreter and translation of documents 
Defendants without an adequate command of the Dutch language have the right to an 
interpreter during interrogations, pre-trial hearings and in trial, and to some extent they 
have a right to written translation of documents (cf. Articles 191 and 275-276 Sv). The 
investigative and trial judges have a responsibility to secure this right. Moreover, the 
defendant can request the assistance of an interpreter during trial (Article 263 Sv). There 
are no restrictions regarding the relevant language. The interpreter will be sworn in every 
time he or she assists in the case. The prosecution has a list of qualified interpreters that can 
be used. There seem to be sufficient interpreters in The Netherlands. Hitherto, interpreters 
had to comply with few requirements, but recently the Dutch Parliament accepted the Act 
on Sworn Interpreters and Translators (Wet beëdigde tolken en vertalers).77 This Act 
contains provisions on the quality and swearing in of interpreters and translators and on a 
procedure for complaints against them. 
 
C. The Right to Privacy 
In Dutch criminal procedure, all ordinary investigative powers are permitted, as well as 
covert investigation methods, such as recording communication, surveillance, infiltration, 
running informants, and undercover pseudo-purchases (Articles 126g-126zu Sv). These 
covert powers can all be applied pro-actively against suspects, against persons who are 
associated with a criminal organisation without necessarily being involved in crime 
themselves, and sometimes even against non-suspect third parties. Apart from the 
requirements already discussed (see sub 3.A.), such powers may only be applied if required 
or urgently required in the interests of the investigation. They must be ordered by the 
prosecutor. For some of the methods – such as the recording of confidential 
communications, the interception of telecommunication, the entry of private premises – the 
order may be given only after authorisation by an investigating judge. Infiltration by 
civilians and laissez passer (doorlating) may be ordered only on the authorisation of the 
                                                 
77 Act of 11 October 2007, Stb. 2007, 375. Entry into force: not yet known. 
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national Board of procurators general (College van procureurs-generaal; see supra section 
II.2.b) after consultation with the Minister of Justice (Article 140a Sv). 
DNA testing (see the definition in Article 138a Sv) against the will of the defendant is 
allowed in the interest of the investigation if there are serious indications (ernstige 
bezwaren) against the suspect that he or she committed a crime for which pre-trial detention 
is permitted (see the requirements discussed under 4.A.c.). The test can be ordered by the 
prosecutor, or by the investigative judge in the event of a judicial preliminary investigation 
(Articles 151b and 195d Sv). The 2004 Act on DNA Testing of Convicted Persons (Wet 
DNA-onderzoek bij veroordeelden) offers the possibility to collect DNA cell material from 
people convicted of a crime for which pre-trial detention is allowed (Article 2 § 1). The 
DNA profiles are to be processed for the purpose of the prevention, detection, prosecution 
and trial of criminal offences only. If execution of the order for the taking of cellular 
material so requires, the public prosecutor may issue a warrant for the arrest of the 
individual concerned (Article 4 § 1). The order to provide cellular material and the 
compilation and storage of the applicant’s DNA profile can be applied against persons who 
have been convicted before the Act entered into force, unless at that point the sentence was 
already fully executed (Article 8). In the case of Van der Velden the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the Act does not violate the principle of legality in Article 7 ECHR 
nor the right to private life in Article 8 ECHR.78  
Municipalities have the power to place cameras in public areas for constant public 
surveillance if this is considered to be necessary for the preservation of public order 
(Article 151c of the 1992 Municipalities Act; Gemeentewet). The recordings may be 
secured for a maximum period of four weeks. They may be used in criminal investigations 
and for the prosecution of offences as well as for evidence in court. 
 
D. The Right to Freedom of Expression and the Role of the Media in Criminal Process 
Court judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers are all, to some degree, allowed to talk to 
the media about ongoing cases. Judges, however, may only speak about the case in very 
general terms. All courts have a special media spokesperson (also a judge), who is 
authorized to explain the trial and the courts decisions to the press and public. Prosecutors 
                                                 
78 ECtHR 7 December 2006, Van der Velden v The Netherlands. 
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can speak more freely, but of course within the limits of the presumption of innocence. The 
prosecution offices all designate one of the prosecutors as media spokesperson. Lawyers 
can enjoy their freedom of expressions as regards individual cases more freely. 
Nevertheless, they may not reveal information which is brought to their attention in 
confidence by the defendant or prosecution. Lawyers can be prosecuted for what they say 
in court or outside if this constitutes an offence which they personally committed. If a 
lawyer defends someone who is being prosecuted for, e.g., hate speech, blasphemy or 
offensive proclamations, the lawyer’s defence and explanation of the defendant’s 
statements will normally be perfectly admissible. In any case, Dutch criminal procedural 
law is not familiar with the legal construct of “contempt of court”. 
 Journalists in The Netherlands can publish and broadcast almost everything they want on 
both ongoing and concluded criminal investigations and trials. Of course, they may not 
commit criminal offences or civil law torts, but apart from that they are scarcely limited in 
what tell the public about the name, address, profession, background, family of the 
defendant, the question of the culprit’s guilt, the punishment he should either get or have 
received, etcetera. In the course of the last decade, the media have become much less 
reserved about criminal cases. For a long time, for instance, the media only referred to 
suspects by their initials, but the full name of suspects and undercover photographs and 
videos are now used more and more frequently. Besides that, in some cases media attention 
seems to be without limit, even to the extent that it influences the trial. Harmful publicity in 
the media about a criminal case or suspect may be considered by the court when deciding 
the sentence.79 The Netherlands Press Council (Raad voor de Journalistiek) is charged with 
the examination of complaints against violations of good journalistic practice. Their 
guidelines state that a “journalist must not publish details in pictures and text as a result of 
which suspects and accused can be easily identified and traced by persons other than the 
circle of people that already know about them. A journalist does not have to observe this 
rule if: the name forms an important part of the report; not mentioning the name because of 
the general reputation of the person involved does not serve any purpose; not mentioning 
the name could cause a mix-up with others who may be predictably harmed as a result; the 
name is mentioned within the framework of investigative reporting; the person himself 
                                                 
79 Cf. Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 18 July 2003, LJN AI0123. 
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seeks publicity.”80 The guidelines and decisions of the Council are not legally binding, nor 
can violations of the guidelines be punished. 
Media do have the right to be present during trial. This only applies to the non-audio-visual 
media. It is forbidden to film or record the trial in court without the specific approval of the 
court. Moreover, the court can order that the hearing shall be held behind closed doors (see 
supra section III.4.e). All courts provide special facilities for the media. These facilities 
differ, depending on the size of the court. A press-card is standard, as is the supply of free 
copies of case-lists to journalists. The court rooms contain tables for the press, and a press-
room is available in the larger courts. In 2003 the judiciary adopted a press guideline for 
dealing with the press.81 
 
E. Protection against Discrimination 
In Article 1, the Constitution holds that “All persons in The Netherlands shall be treated 
equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political 
opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.” And, for 
example, Article 1 ECHR, which must be considered part of the legal order of The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (see supra section I.1) states that the rights and freedoms in 
the Convention shall be secured to everyone within the jurisdiction of The Kingdom. All 
individuals – citizens and non-citizens, and nationals and non-nationals alike – must 
therefore be indiscriminately guaranteed a fair trial and all other fundamental rights 
relevant to criminal process.  
 
F. Protection against Double Jeopardy (ne bis in idem) 
If a criminal trial in The Netherlands, The Netherlands Antilles or Aruba has resulted in a 
final verdict with power of res judicata the defendant in that case cannot be prosecuted in 
any of these countries, put on trial or punished again for the offence for which he or she 
was acquitted or convicted in that verdict (Article 68 Sr82). If the verdict has been rendered 
by a foreign criminal court, the same applies if the defendant was acquitted (vrijspraak) or 
dismissed of all charges (ontslag van alle rechtsvervolging), and in case of a conviction, if 
                                                 
80 On the Netherlands Press Council, see <http://www.rvdj.nl>. (website is partly in English, and contains an English version of the Guidelines 
and of the amendments). 
81 The 2003 Press Guideline is available in English on <http://www.rechtspraak.nl> (go via: Actualiteiten, Informatie voor de pers). 
82 See in greater detail Andre Klip & Harmen van der Wilt, The Netherlands, Non bis in idem, vol. 73 International Review of Penal Law (AIDP, 
2002), p. 1091-1137. 
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punishment has been imposed, followed by complete enforcement, pardon, or lapse of time. 
Prosecution for an offence is also barred if the suspect has already fulfilled a condition set 
by the competent authorities of a foreign state in order to finally settle the case and prevent 
prosecution for that offence (the so-called foreign transaction; cf. 3.B.b.). At present 
criminal procedure in The Kingdom of the Netherlands only allows for reopening of closed 
cases in the defendant’s favour, by the remedy of revision (herziening; see supra sub 3.D.I). 
However, the Dutch government is preparing a Bill that contains limited grounds for 
revision of criminal judgments by which the defendant is acquitted or dismissed of all 
charges. It will become possible to reopen cases if new evidence (e.g., DNA test) has come 
to light and the case concerns an offence that carries a maximum punishment of life 
imprisonment, or if certain procedural irregularities have occurred (e.g., forgery of a crucial 
case document, perjury crucial to the case, and bribery of officials, judges, etcetera).  
 
G. Consequences of Misuse or Abuse of Power and/or Infringement of Fundamental Rights 
There are specific rules Dutch criminal procedure for the situation in which it appears to a 
trial court that procedures have been breached in the preliminary investigation and it is no 
longer possible to repair the violation (see Article 359a Sv). If the legal consequences are 
not otherwise provided for in law, the court can determine: that the mere recognition by the 
court of the procedural breach provides sufficient redress, that the sentence shall be 
mitigated, that evidence shall be excluded, or that the prosecution shall be stayed. In 
choosing between these consequences the court takes into account the interests served by 
the infringed rule, the seriousness of the defect and the disadvantage caused by it. The court 
has a wide discretionary power in deciding what sanction will be applied. 
A statement of a suspect that is obtained by putting unlawful pressure on him or her during 
the interrogation (cf. supra sub 4.A.b.) will be excluded as evidence. Treatment violating 
the prohibition against torture in Article 3 ECHR, results in a stay of prosecution. If the 
treatment constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, it 
will depend on the circumstances whether this must lead to a stay of prosecution, or only to 
exclusion of the statement obtained through the ill-treatment. An official who conducts 
such an unlawful interrogation could be disciplined internally or punished in a criminal 
trial. 
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Regarding unlawful acts by the criminal investigation and prosecuting authorities, it is 
important that a stay of prosecution can only come into play if the acts concerned constitute 
serious breaches of the principles governing proper proceedings by which, deliberately or 
with gross negligence, the accused’s right to a fair hearing (Article 6 ECHR) has been 
disrespected.83 This means that a stay will not follow in the event of a mere violation of the 
right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR (there was no reasonable suspicion, without the 
necessary authorisation, or in contravention of other procedural rules) of invasive methods 
of surveillance by investigative authorities. Depending on the seriousness of the violation 
this will normally result in the exclusion of evidence obtained through the violation or in a 
reduction of sentence. 
Breaches of custody or pre-trial detention rights cannot be brought up in trial if these have 
already been reviewed or could have been reviewed by a judge or court during the pre-trial 
investigation phase (cf. supra sub 4.A.b. and c.). This is barred by the principle of the 
closed system of remedies (gesloten stelsel van rechtsmiddelen).84  
If the reasonable time requirements (see supra sub 4.B.d.) are not met this will usually lead 
to a small reduction of the sentence. Only recently the Supreme Court ascertained that it 
cannot – that is no longer – lead to a stay of prosecution. This sanction could, however, still 
be applied if politicians or important public officials were, deliberately or with gross 
negligence, to make a statement on individual cases that are before the courts and such 
statements would constitute a violation of the presumption of innocence or the right to a 
fair trial in Article 6 ECHR which seriously affects the defendant. Deliberately withholding 
crucial evidence by the accused or seriously deceiving the court might also have to result in 
a declaration of inadmissibility of the defence. 
 
H. State of Emergency and Derogation from Obligations under Human Rights Treaties 
Article 103 of the Constitution allows for declaration by Royal Decree of a state of 
emergency in order to maintain internal or external security. A Royal Decree is an order of 
the government, i.e. The Queen and the Ministers in Council. According to the 1996 Act on 
the Coordination of Emergency Situations (Coördinatiewet uitzonderingstoestanden) the 
declaration has to be requested by the Prime Minister, and immediately reported to the 
                                                 
83 See HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, with case-note by T. Schalken; HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, with case-note by Y. Buruma. 
84 HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, with case note by Y. Buruma. 
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States General (Staten Generaal, i.e., the Second and First Chamber together) and 
published in the Staatsblad (the official Bulletin of Acts). Both the government and the 
States General can terminate a state of emergency. Furthermore, the States General can set 
a time limit. 
The declaration may derogate from the constitutional fundamental rights of religion 
(Article 6) insofar as the exercise of this freedom other than in buildings and enclosed 
places is concerned, of expression (Article 7), association (Article 8), assembly and 
demonstration (Article 9), respect for the home (Article 12) and correspondence (Article 
13), and from the constitutional obligations that the trial of offences shall be the 
responsibility of the judiciary, and that a sentence entailing deprivation of liberty may be 
imposed only by the judiciary (Article 113 § 1 and § 3). Although the Constitution does not 
expressly refer to the non-derogability of certain rights and freedoms, those constitutional 
rights and freedoms that are not mentioned in Article 103 could be considered as such. So, 
as far as criminal procedure is concerned, the rights to privacy (Article 10), inviolability of 
the person (Article 11), liberty and habeas corpus (Article 15), access to the competent 
court (Article 17), legal representation (Article 18), as well as the acceptance that trials 
shall be held in public, and that judgments shall specify the grounds on which they are 
based, and be pronounced in public (Article 121) are non-derogable in that respect. 
Nevertheless, all these fundamental rights may always be restricted or at least regulated by 
Act of Parliament. Only the legality principle or nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali 
(Article 16), and the prohibition of capital punishment (Article 114), can be neither limited 
nor derogated from in time of peace or during a state of emergency.  
 As has already been mentioned, the Constitution does not provide for a provision on the 
right to fair trial as such. So according to Dutch domestic law the right to a fair trial is 
neither derogable nor non-derogable. However, since suspension of Articles 93 and 94 of 
the Constitution is not provided for, the derogation regimes of particularly the ECHR and 
the ICCPR will remain intact during a state of emergency. Both the European Convention 
as the United Nations Covenant allow for derogation from the right to a fair trial in Article 
6 ECHR (see Article 15 § 2 ECHR) and in Article 14 ICCPR (see Article 4 § 2 ICCPR). 
Fair trial rights may therefore also be suspended in The Netherlands in the event of a state 
of emergency. 
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5. RECENT LEGAL CHANGES IN DUTCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AFFECTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A. General 
During the last decade many changes within criminal procedure have occurred in The 
Netherlands. This section points out some of the most important recent changes as a result 
of changing perceptions of public safety and the risk of certain types of crimes (e.g., 
terrorism, organised crime). Furthermore, attention will be paid to some amendments of 
criminal procedure that affect the way fundamental rights are secured and can be enjoyed in 
ordinary criminal cases.85 Most of the reforms amend the existing common legal 
framework of criminal law enforcement. Some of the changes made to strengthen the fight 
against terrorism, involve some fundamental departures from the foundations of criminal 
procedure, but most of these deviations were limited to terrorism cases (see infra the 
introduction of 5.B. for an exception regarding the definition on criminal investigation). At 
present no major legislative reforms in the field of criminal procedure law are being 
discussed in parliament.86 Less fundamental criminal procedure Bills will be mentioned if 
relevant to the subjects discussed below. 
In general, one could note that, although human rights in the Netherlands are generally 
taken seriously by the legislator, the administration and the judiciary, fundamental rights 
seem increasingly to function only as absolute minimum conditions which have to be met. 
As a result, international human rights provisions are increasingly sparingly implemented 
and assured in several policy and legal areas in the Netherlands. This applies to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and holds to an even greater degree in relation to 
other Council of Europe instruments and the United Nations covenants and treaties. 
However, some counterbalance might be underway: parliament is currently discussing a 
Bill that partly lifts the prohibition on the courts to review Acts against constitutional 
                                                 
85 Many of the legislative amendments of the last few years have been the result of the academic project Strafvordering 2001 (Criminal 
procedure 2001). See the four reports of the project: M.S. Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge (eds), respectively Groningen: Drukkerij Rijksuniversiteit 
Groningen 1999, Deventer: Gouda Quint 2001, Deventer: Kluwer 2002 en 2004. 
86 For an overview, see Letter of the Minister of Justice, Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 29 271, nr. 7. 
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fundamental rights (see supra sub 2.A.).87 If accepted – the Bill has already passed the 
Second Chamber – the prohibition will no longer apply to, e.g., all the constitutional rights 
and requirements mentioned supra sub 3.A.. 
 
B. Pre-trial Setting 
As regards criminal pre-trial investigation, many laws, measures and practices of course 
imply restrictions on the right to a private life. However, not only do the ways to restrict the 
privacy of citizens seem to be increasing constantly, what is more, in combination the 
restrictions are very far-reaching and they form a severe restriction on the privacy of 
citizens.88 This is a development that cannot be captured very well, either by the Supreme 
Court of The Netherlands or the European Court of Human Rights. The Supreme Court is 
currently still not authorized to review Acts of Parliament against fundamental 
constitutional rights (toetsingsverbod; see supra sub 2.A. and 5.A.), while the European 
Court in fact only deals with human rights violations on a case-by-case basis and hardly 
ever decides on general developments as such.  
So, for example, The Netherlands has been the world leader in tapping telephone 
conversations for some years now:89 In the second half of 2007 the Dutch authorities tapped 
12,491 telephone numbers (84% mobile; 16% land line).90 In the Code of Criminal 
Procedure the power to tap telephones is subject to the most severe conditions within the 
code, yet this power can apparently be used quite easily. Intrusion on privacy therefore has 
become relatively simple within the criminal justice system. 
A fundamental, dogmatic change regarding criminal investigation was caused by the 2007 
amendment of the definition of criminal investigation in Article 132a Sv. 91 The new 
definition is much wider than the old one. Although it was introduced in anti-terrorism 
legislation, it actually applies to criminal investigation in general. Before the amendment, 
Article 132a Sv stated that a criminal investigation shall mean an investigation led by the 
public prosecutor with the aim of taking decisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure 
                                                 
87 See Kamerstukken 28 331 (see the text of the Bill in: Eerste Kamer 2004-2005, nr. A). 
88 Cf. Privacy International, Leading surveillance societies in the EU and the World 2007, on <http://www.privacyinternational.org> (see under: 
Key PI Resources). 
89 See, e.g., NRC Handelsblad 29 May 2008, ‘1.700 gesprekken per dag afgetapt’ (1.700 conversations wiretapped per day) 
(<http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/article1900270.ece/1.700_gesprekken_per_dag_afgetapt>); De Groene Amsterdammer 2002 (week 25), 
‘Aftappers in het nauw’ (Wiretappers cornered)  (<http://www.groene.nl/2002/0225/rz_tappen.html>). 
90 Letter from the Minister of Justice, Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 30 517, nr. 6.  
91 Introduced by the 2007 Act on the expansion of the possibilities for investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences (Wet verruiming 
mogelijkheden opsporing en vervolging terroristische misdrijven); see infra sub 5.B.a. 
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and prompted by a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed or that such 
offences are being planned or committed by a criminal organisation. Now it means an 
investigation in relation to criminal offences led by the public prosecutor with the aim of 
taking decisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure. So the existence of a reasonable 
suspicion is no longer the principal basis of criminal investigations; pro-active 
investigations and the use of intrusive investigative powers must be regarded as perfectly 
normal as far as the definition is concerned. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the government is preparing a Bill on financial 
compensation for the use of coercive powers (schadevergoeding voor de toepassing van 
dwangmiddelen).92 It will cover investigative powers in all cases. 
 
a. Special provisions for terrorism cases 
Most significant with regard to security legislation is the 2007 Act on the Expansion of the 
Possibilities for Investigating and Prosecuting Terrorist Offences (Wet verruiming 
mogelijkheden opsporing en vervolging terroristische misdrijven).93 The most important 
provisions in the Act are the following. First, it provides for the possibility to hold terrorism 
suspects in remand custody (bewaring) for two weeks even if there are no strong 
allegations against them (see supra sub 4.A.c.). The Dutch legal system does not allow for 
secret arrest and detention, deportation and extraordinary rendition without habeas corpus. 
Second, information from the investigation can now be kept confidential for a maximum of 
two years and 90 days by postponing the trial (see supra sub 4.A.c. and 4.B.h.), although 
evidence supportive of the defendant’s case may never be deleted, not even in special 
circumstances. Finally, the Act allows the use of all special covert investigative powers as 
well as powers to search objects, vehicles and clothing if there is merely “an indication of a 
terrorist crime” (see supra sub 4.A.a.). As for the last mentioned amendment: the 
application of intrusive powers on such a vague basis might be problematic with regard to 
Article 8 ECHR, since restrictions on the right to a private life must be foreseeable, i.e., 
they must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his 
conduct. The possibilities for the investigative judge and courts to review the necessity, 
                                                 
92 Letter from the Minister of Justice, Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 29 271, nr. 7. See also Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 164, nr. 19 (Motie 
van het Lid Weekers c.s.). 
93 Act of 20 November 2006, Stb. 2006, 580; entry into force: 1 February 2007 (Stb. 2006, 731). 
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proportionality and lawfulness of the application of these powers in terrorism cases are 
relatively limited compared to equivalent powers in ordinary and organised crime cases. 
Moreover, none of the very broad powers is restricted to crimes against life or crimes that 
carry a maximum of life imprisonment; they can be utilized in all terrorist crimes.  
It is important to note that the possibility of applying investigative powers has also been 
deliberately extended by the criminalization of several acts that were not previously 
criminal offences. The 2004 Act on Terrorist Offences (Wet terroristische misdrijven) 
widened the criminal law to conspiracy (samenspanning; Article 80 Sr) to commit several 
terrorist offences (Articles 114b, 120b, 176b, 282c, 292a, 304b, 415b Sr), to the terrorist 
criminal organisation (Article 140a Sr), and to recruitment for violent Jihad (Article 205 
Sr).94 When investigating all these offences it is possible to utilize investigative powers 
against persons who have not (yet) committed a tangible crime. So this criminalisation 
offers the opportunity to investigate in what is in fact a pro-active phase.  
 
b. Interrogation of the suspect 
The right to have counsel present does not in principle apply during the first period of the 
culprit’s questioning (see supra sub 4.A.b). However, as of 1 May 2008 an experiment has 
been running in which suspects accused of a crime against life may have their counsel 
present during police interrogations. The experiment will run for two years in the 
jurisdictions of the police forces of Amsterdam-Amstelland and Rotterdam-Rijnmond 
only.95 
As has already been mentioned, the police, prosecutor and investigative judge at present are 
under no general obligation to record interrogations with audio or video-equipment. The 
Minister of Justice, however, has stated by letter to parliament that interrogations of 
suspects will be audio recorded if a crime is implicated that is listed in the Criminal Code 
and carries a maximum punishment of at least twelve years, or that caused someone’s death 
or serious injury, or that concerns a serious sex offence, or if a child under 16 or a mentally 
handicapped person is involved in the case as a suspect, witness, or victim.96 
 
                                                 
94 Act of 24 June 2004, Stb. 2004, 290; entry into force: 10 August 2004 (Stb. 2004, 373). 
95 It is now doubtful whether the experiment will be enough to satisfy the new requirements apparently set out by the European Court. See 
note 74 supra and ECtHR 27 November 2008, Salduz v Turkey, and ECtHR 11 December 2008, Panovits v Cyprus.  
96 See Kamerstukken II, 2005-2006, 30 300 VI, nr. 178, p. 2. 
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c. Detention 
Since 1990 the prison population, especially the numbers serving prison sentences and in 
pre-trial detention, have grown almost constantly in the Netherlands. The total number of 
people in Dutch prisons increased from 6,800 (in 1990) to 17,600 (in 2005) (in 2006 the 
number decreased slightly to 16,230, but it is very uncertain whether this constitutes the 
start of a trend).97 The numbers serving sentences in prison and pre-trial detention are 
primarily responsible for these statistics. Moreover, for around a decade now there has been 
a huge increase in the number of cases in which defendants are sentenced to life 
imprisonment (which in the Netherlands is indeed deprivation of liberty for the term of 
one’s natural life). These developments raise the question of whether the principles of 
proportionality and necessity, as contained in Article 5 ECHR, are adequately applied with 
regard to the deprivation of liberty, especially of those suspected of an ordinary offence. It 
has already been explained under 5.B.a. that the standards have been lowered for terrorism 
cases. 
 
d. Data requisition 
The 2005 Act on the Power to Requisition Data (Wet bevoegdheden vorderen gegevens; see 
Articles 126nn-126ni Sv) provides the police with powers facilitating the collection of  
“identifying data” from individuals, legal bodies and companies.98 Moreover, the 2007 
Police Data Act (Wet politiegegevens) introduced rather wide provisions to provide private 
individuals and private bodies with data collected by the authorities.99 So, via the police, 
data can now fairly simply pass around between the private and the public sector. 
Furthermore, the Bill on the duty to retain telecommunication data (Wet bewaarplicht 
telecommunicatiegegevens), which is currently passing through parliament, contains an 
obligation on telecommunication suppliers to retain, for a period of twelve months, data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks.100 The Bill aims to 
                                                 
97 See further: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, Criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving 2006. Ontwikkelingen en 
samenhangen, (Onderzoek en beleid, nr. 255), p. 491, Table 6.3 (at: <www.wodc.nl>); and the World Prison Brief (at: 
<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/>). 
98 Act of 16 July 2005, Stb. 2005, 390; entry into force: 1 January 2006 (Stb. 2005, 690). 
99 Act of 21 July 2007, Stb. 2007, 300; entry into force: 1 January 2008 (Stb. 2007, 549). 
100 Amended Bill of 22 May 2008, Kamerstukken 31 145 (see First Chamber, 2007-2008, nr. A). 
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implement EU Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006.101  
 
e. Obligation to carry identification papers, camera surveillance, DNA, blood tests  
After a long and tense discussion, the 2004 Act on the Extended Obligation to Identify 
Oneself (Wet op de uitgebreide identificatieplicht) entered into force on 1 January 2005.102 
The obligation implies that any individual from the age of 14 in the public space must 
always immediately be able to show identification papers if so requested by the police, 
military police or public surveillance officer. Officials can request identification papers if 
this is reasonably necessary for the fulfilment of their task, e.g., the investigation of 
criminal offences. 
The 2005 Act on Camera Surveillance103 gave municipalities the power to place cameras in 
public areas in order to hold the public under constant surveillance if this is considered to 
be necessary for the preservation of public order. The recordings may be used in criminal 
procedure (see supra sub 4.C.). In a way, this criminal investigative power therefore 
spreads out indirectly over the life of non-suspect individuals when they are present in the 
public space. 
For the purpose of the prevention, detection, prosecution and trial of criminal offences, the 
2004 Act on DNA Testing of Convicted Persons (Wet DNA-onderzoek bij veroordeelden) 
offers the possibility to collect DNA cell material from people convicted of a crime for 
which pre-trial detention is allowed (see supra sub 4.C.).104  
 At present, parliament is discussing a Bill on compulsory cooperation with a blood test in 
criminal cases (verplichte medewerking aan een bloedtest in strafzaken). The legislative 
proposal aims to provide the possibility to force a suspect or other party to cooperate with 
an examination by which it can be ascertained whether he or she carries a virus that could 
be transmitted while committing a criminal offence on the victim.105 
 
f. Witness procedures 
                                                 
101 Published in Official Journal of the European Union, L 105/54 of 13.4.2006. 
102 Act of 24 June 2004, Stb. 2004, 300; on the entry into force, see Stb. 2004, 583. 
103 Act of 30 June 2005, Stb. 2005, 392; entry into force: 1 February 2006 (Stb. 2006, 32). 
104 Act of 16 September 2004, Stb. 2004, 465; entry into force: 1 February 2005 (partly; Stb. 2005, 18), 1 March 2005 (partly; Stb. 2005, 80), 1 
May 2006 (partly; Stb. 2006, 220), and 1 August 2006 (partly; Stb. 2006, 312). 
105 Bill of 11 October 2007, Kamerstukken 31 241. 
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Several new Acts concern witnesses. The Act on Commitments to Witnesses in Criminal 
Cases (toezeggingen aan getuigen in strafzaken) was introduced in 2006, which allows for 
the use as evidence of witness statements that have been given by suspects or convicts in 
exchange for reduction of the sentence they might receive in their own case or already have 
received (see supra sub 4.B.h.).106 The 2006 Act on Covert Witnesses (Wet afgeschermde 
getuigen) to keep witnesses covert for reasons of state security also entered into force that 
year (see supra sub 4.B.h.).107 In a similar way as the procedure for threatened witnesses 
these procedures can be of particular interest in terrorism and organised crime cases. 
All these kind of procedures cause difficulties for both the defence and trial court judges 
seeking to independently question witnesses and assess and contest the reliability of their 
statements. The procedures were introduced in order to comply with the requirement of the 
right to a fair trial in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 
ECHR when making use of witness statements that have been obtained from anonymous 
witnesses or under other special circumstances. This cannot, however, alter the fact that the 
introduction of these procedures has contributed to a shift of power from the trial courts to 
the investigative judge and the prosecution. Moreover, the covert witness legislation has 
brought intelligence investigations further into the field of criminal procedure. In that sense 
a shift is taking place: criminal justice is no longer only founded on police investigations 
but increasingly on intelligence as well.  
Another new provision that deserves mentioning here is the possibility to question suspects, 
witnesses and experts through a video and audio link, a so called videoconferentie (see 
supra sub 4.B.h).108 This amendment also came about in the framework of the security 
programme. 
 
g. Prosecution 
The procedure of “prosecution through penal orders” (OM afdoening door 
strafbeschikking), which was introduced 1 February 2008 in Article 257a Sv, involves a 
most fundamental change of the criminal justice system (see supra sub 3.B.b. and 4.B.b.). 
This procedure in fact lays the criminal investigation, prosecution, trial of the facts, 
                                                 
106 Act of 12 May 2005, Stb. 2005, 254; entry into force: 1 April 2006 (Stb. 2006, 150). 
107 Act of 28 September 2006, Stb. 2006, 460; entry into force: 1 November 2006 (Stb. 2006, 461). 
108 Act of 16 July 2005, Stb. 2005, 388; entry into force: 1 January 2007 (Stb. 2006, 209). 
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deciding on the punishment and execution of the punishment all in the hands of the 
prosecutor. This amendment constitutes a shift of power from the courts to the prosecution 
as regards trying the facts and deciding on the punishment. Of course, the defendant can 
object to the order and have his case heard by a court. But in the face of fear of a prolonged 
period of insecurity about the outcome of a trial, coupled with apprehension of the public 
trial itself, suspects might choose to comply with the order immediately, even if their case 
could not have been proven in court or if they might have expected a less severe sentence at 
trial. 
As regards the possibility to prosecute those suspected of the most serious crimes, it is 
noteworthy that as of 1 January 2006 the statute of limitation has been removed for all 
crimes that carry a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.109 The statutory maximum 
punishment of many offences has been raised as of 1 February 2005.110 The maximum limit 
on the term of temporary imprisonment went up from twenty to thirty years with this 
amendment of the law.  
  
C. Trial Setting: Special Proceedings and Special Procedural Law? 
Generally, the competent court in first instance is roughly speaking the District Court of the 
jurisdiction in which the offence was committed or in which the defendant lives. There are 
some exceptions. The District Court of The Hague, for example, is the competent court for 
criminal offences that fall within the ambit of the Act on International Crimes (Wet 
internationale misdrijven), crimes and some infractions committed by military are tried 
before the District Court of Arnhem, and the Amsterdam District Court is competent in 
insider trading cases. Of more importance here is that the District Court of Rotterdam is 
competent if an offence is prosecuted by the national prosecution office (landelijk parket; 
cf. supra sub 3.B.b.), which focuses on (inter)national organised crime and terrorism. If a 
terrorist or organised crime case is prosecuted by one of the district prosecution offices, 
however, the District Court in that district is competent as usual. In any event, both terrorist 
and organised crime cases are always tried before an ordinary court; Dutch law does not 
provide for military or any other special court for such cases. Nor do any special rules other 
                                                 
109 Act of 16 November 2005, Stb. 2005, 595; on the entry into force, see Stb. 2005, 596. 
110 Act of 22 December 2005, Stb. 2006, 11; on the entry into force, see Stb. 2006, 23.  
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than those discussed before apply to such proceedings: suspects in such cases in principle 
enjoy the same rights as other suspects. 
 
D. Appeal 
The 2006 Act on Streamlining Appeal (Stroomlijnen hoger beroep) limited the possibilities 
to appeal in cases in which only a fine of no more than € 500 is imposed (cf. supra section 
II.4).111 More importantly, the essence of the appeal procedure has been fundamentally 
amended in order to secure a more efficient procedure and lighten the workload of the 
appeal courts: appeal no longer implies a second, new, full and complete reconsideration of 
the case, but merely operates as a “continuous procedure” which will concentrate on 
matters in dispute. In principle, only issues addressed by the defence in the grounds of 
appeal are discussed in the appeal trial. This means that this procedural phase is much more 
adversarial in nature than the trial in first instance. But it also means that the appeal courts 
will offer defendants less ex officio legal protection now than under the former appeal 
regime. However, in the specific cases of organised crime and terrorism, the legislator has 
not in any other way limited or otherwise modified the rights of a higher court to review 
either the facts of a case or a sentence.  
 
E. Post-trial protection: the principle of ne bis in idem 
The prohibition against double jeopardy applies in exactly the same way in respect of 
terrorism and other serious offences as it does for any other offence. Although the legislator 
is currently drafting a Bill on the reopening of closed criminal cases – to the disadvantage 
of acquitted defendants – the proposed grounds for revision are not in any way specifically 
limited to or aimed at terrorist or organised crime cases (see supra sub 4.F.). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
With the principle that concludes tried cases indefinitely – the ne bis in idem principle – I 
have also come to the conclusion of this contribution. To my eyes, the foregoing shows that 
there is genuine concern for human rights in the Dutch criminal procedure law system. 
Where fundamental rights are insufficiently provided for in domestic law this is in general 
                                                 
111 Act of 5 October 2006, Stb. 2006, 470; entry into force: 1 March 2007 (partly), 1 July 2007 (Stb. 2007, 70). 
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adequately counterbalanced by applying international human rights standards. That the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Netherlands does not contain a right to a fair trial is 
effectively neutralized via direct application of the right to a fair trial, in particular in 
Article 6 ECHR. 
Nevertheless, some fundamental changes in criminal procedure in The Netherlands have 
occurred in the last decade or so, underpinned by terrorism, organised crime and the wish to 
make the criminal justice system more efficient. This has also affected the position of the 
courts, prosecution, defence and victims in the system and the way human rights are 
assured by it. All changes seem to be in conformity with the human rights standards as set 
by international organizations like the Council of Europe and the United Nations. 
Particularly the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights exerts an incredible 
influence in this regard. Nevertheless, the legislator, administration and courts these days 
seem to have other concerns than only trying to provide the best human rights standard 
possible. As a result, fundamental rights seem increasingly to function only as absolute 
minimum conditions which have to be met, less and less as guiding principles, the generous 
fulfilment of which is an aspiration for legislation, policy and practice.  
